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INTRODUCTION

EGINNING in March 2003, the Wall Street Journal ran a series of articles focusing on hospitals that charge uninsured patients inflated hos-

1. See Review of Hospital Billing and Collections Practices: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 9 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Charles F. Bass,
Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=108_househearings&docid=f:95446.pdf (stating that "there are no clear
villains and there are no clear heroes").
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University. The author wishes
to thank Theresa Colbert, Donna Parent and the Albany Law School Computer
Resources Department staff for technical support, and the research librarians at
the Albany Law School Schaffer Law Library for research assistance.
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pital rates and aggressively hound them to make collections. 2 The articles
emphasized the draconian collections methods used by some hospitals,
including residential foreclosures and even "body attachments," where the
3
patient debtors were jailed until they could pay bail.
At the same time, a number of investigational reports were being published showing the devastating effects of overwhelming medical debt on
families, coupled with census figures showing an ever-rising number of uninsured in this country. 4 One such report by The Commonwealth Fund
announced findings in June 2003 that hospitals' reluctance to lower
charges to the uninsured resulted in long term debt for the affected families. 5 The report also announced that the problem was apparently caused
by unclear federal laws and regulations that had the unintended effect of
discouraging hospitals from offering services at free or reduced rates to
6
the uninsured.
During the summer of 2004, the increased attention to the issue of
excessive hospital charges to the uninsured resulted in a wave of class action lawsuits across the nation. 7 Uninsured patients alleged that hospitals
charged them substantially higher rates than the hospitals accepted from
private insurance plans, Medicare and Medicaid for comparable services.8
The lawsuits also alleged that the hospitals failed to advise the uninsured
patients of available options for charity care, and then aggressively pursued the patients to make collection on the exorbitant bills.9
Also in the summer of 2004, the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives held a hearing to review hospital
billing and collections practices for the uninsured. 10 The hearing followed a year-long investigation of the issue, wherein the Committee col2. For a further discussion of the Wall StreetJournal("Journal") articles on hospital billing and collections for the uninsured, see infra notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
3. For a further discussion of the aggressive collections methods used by some
hospitals, see infra notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of the devastating effects that medical debt and the
rising number of uninsured have in America, see infra notes 67-98 and accompanying text.
5. For a further discussion of the Commonwealth Fund's report, see infra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of the report's suggestion that hospital billing and
collections practices were encouraged by ambiguous federal health care laws, see
infra note 91 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of class action lawsuits alleging excessive medical
charges, see infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the uninsured patients' allegations in the excessive medical charges class action suits, see infra notes 121-36 and accompanying
text.
9. For a further discussion of the types of patient mistreatment alleged in the
class action lawsuits, see infra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the hearing held by the Committee on Energy
and Commerce of the House of Representatives to review hospital procedures relating to the uninsured, see infra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
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lected detailed information from twenty hospital systems on their billing
and collections practices." Thus began an intensive examination of a
healthcare anomaly that was not appreciated by the general population of
healthcare consumers, but which was generally known and accepted by
the healthcare industry for decades: the only segment of society that pays
full and undiscounted charges for hospital care is the uninsured-the very
segment of the population that is least able and likely to pay full charges
for medical care. 1 2 Governmental agencies in charge of regulating healthcare have known this, the hospital industry has known this and private
insurers and HMOs have known this; nonetheless, these entities have done
13
little or nothing to complain about the inequity or press for reform.
This Article will examine how this situation came about and what the
healthcare regulators and industry have done about it. Part II will describe the Wall StreetJournalarticles that woke the nation to the exorbitant
hospital charges for uninsured patients. 14 Part III will discuss the findings
of investigational reports that hospitals have largely failed to provide charity care to uninsured patients.' 5 Part IV will explain how hospitals develop
their charges and why the charges have become so much higher than the
rates payable by government plans and private insurers. 16 Part V will look
at the recent wave of class action lawsuits across the country, wherein uninsured patients are suing hospitals for what they contend are unreasonable
charges and overly aggressive collections practices.1 7 Part VI will look at
11. For a further discussion of the Committee's investigation into the billing
and collections procedures used by hospitals on the uninsured, see infra notes 13862 and accompanying text.
12. But see Hearing,supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Rep. Greg Walden, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations) (pointing out that of those who went without health insurance for given
year, 8.2% had household income in excess of $75,000 and 20% had household
income over $50,000). Certain uninsured patients are not indigent; uninsured patients are also those who have the apparent means but choose not to purchase
insurance. See id. (stating that not all uninsured are indigent). Non-indigents who
pay full charges include patients with medical savings accounts and international
visitors who come to the United States for healthcare. See id. at 16 (describing
groups of uninsured patients).
13. See, e.g., id. at 4 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood, Member, H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations) (questioning why hospitals did not raise issue of uninsured charges with
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
14. For a further discussion of the Wall Street Journalarticles that brought the
issue of hospital charges for uninsured patients to the public's attention, see infra
notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the investigational reports regarding hospitals'
failures to provide charity care to uninsured patients, see infra notes 67-98 and
accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the development of hospital charges and an
explanation of why charges for uninsured patients are so high, see infra notes 99115 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the recent wave of class action lawsuits, see
infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: p. 95

the testimony produced at a June 2004 congressional hearing on hospital
billing and collections practices ("congressional hearing"). i8 Part VII will
analyze the respective positions of the hospitals and the federal regulators
on the issue of uninsured charges. 19 Part VIII will examine the initial outcomes in the federal class actions and Part IX will look at the early outcomes in the class actions that have been filed in state forums. 20 Part X
will examine the recent changes in hospital billing and collections practices. 21 Finally, Part XI will state the author's conclusions: the recent
changes in hospital billing and collections practices have alleviated some
22
of the uninsureds' problems, but numerous others still remain.
II.

WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLES AWAKEN THE NATION TO THE
REALITIES OF HOSPITAL CHARGES TO THE UNINSURED

America first became aware of the issue of exorbitant hospital charges
for the uninsured through a series of Wall StreetJournal ("Journal') articles
beginning in March 2003. The articles began by telling the story of
Quinton White, a seventy-seven year-old retired dry-cleaning worker suffering from kidney and heart ailments who was paying off a hospital debt that
his now-deceased wife had incurred twenty years previously when she was
treated for cancer at Yale-New Haven Hospital.23 The article, Twenty Years
and Still Paying, described how the original $18,740 hospital bill had blossomed to nearly $55,000 after the addition of interest and fees. 24 The
hospital, through its attorney, put a lien on Mr. White's modest home 25 .
and seized most of his bank account. 26 Over time, Mr. White paid the
hospital close to the amount of the original bill, but $39,000 still remained, with interest alone reaching $33,000.27
18. For a further discussion of the testimony regarding hospital billing and
collections practices produced at the congressional hearing, see infra notes 138-62
and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the positions of hospitals and federal regulators, see infra notes 163-204 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the initial outcomes in the federal class actions,
see infra notes 20543 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the early
outcomes in state class actions, see infra notes 244-64 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of recent changes that have occurred in hospital
billing and collections practices, see infra notes 265-312 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the author's conclusions, see infra notes 313-27
and accompanying text.
23. See Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still Paying,WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2003, at BI [hereinafter Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still Paying] (explaining that
patient's husband still owes debt to hospital and that amount is growing due to ten
percent interest charges on original bill).
24. See id. (elaborating growth of debt from medical bills).
25. See id. (stating that lien was placed on White's house in 1983).
26. See id. (stating that hospital's lawyer drained Mr. White's bank account to
pay for his wife's medical bill debt in 1996).
27. See id. (explaining that despite paying almost entire original bill for medical care, due to interest and other fees, total bill for treatment grew to $55,000).
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Almost immediately after publication of the White article, the Journal
received over 100 e-mails from readers seeking to help Mr. White.28 Air
France offered Mr. White free round-trip tickets to allow him to realize his
lifelong dream of visiting France.2 9 Dozens of readers offered cash contributions or frequent flyer miles.30 The public reaction led the hospital's
senior vice president to personally phone Mr. White's son to announce
that the hospital was forgiving the debt. 3 1 The attorney who had relentlessly pursued Mr. White for twenty years followed with a letter stating that
32
the lien had been lifted from Mr. White's home.
The Journal followed up with the story of Rebekah Nix. 33 Ms. Nix was
a completely different type of patient from Mr. White: she was young (only
twenty-five years old), relatively healthy and a college graduate. 34 But after declining to maintain her health insurance through her past employer,
she too found herself uninsured and in need of hospital treatment in
April 2002 when she arrived at the New York Methodist Hospital emergency room with severe abdominal pains. 35 She was temporarily unemployed, living on unemployment benefits of $1122 a month and unable to
afford health insurance.3 6 After tests confirmed that she had appendicitis,

28. See Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years-and He Isn't PayingAny More, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 1, 2003, at BI (elaborating on outpouring of sympathy resulting from previous article).
29. See id. (describing public contributions to White).
30. See id. (documenting outpouring of support).
31. See id. (noting decision of Yale-New Haven Hospital to cancel White's
debt).
32. See id. (summarizing letter from Yale-New Haven Hospital's attorney that
notified White of removal of lien).
33. See Lucette Lagnado, Full Price: A Young Woman, An Appendectomy, and a
$19,000 Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Lagnado, Full Price]
(telling story of uninsured woman saddled with huge medical bills after two days of
inpatient care).
34. See id. (describing patient's background).
35. See id. (accounting events leading to Nix's hospitalization).
36. See id. (describing Nix's status as unemployed with reduced income and,
thus, no health insurance). Ms. Nix qualified for coverage under the 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), but did not take advantage
of it. See id. (stating that Nix chose not to continue health coverage under health
plan provided by employer). COBRA allows qualified workers to retain their employer-sponsored health insurance for a limited period of time after they leave
their employment by paying the employer's costs of the coverage plus a two percent administrative fee. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169 (2000) (detailing plan for continuing coverage). Most unemployed individuals, however, find it difficult to
afford the COBRA premiums required to retain the coverage. See ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON FOUND., GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE: NEARLY ONE IN THREE NONELDERLY AMERICANS 11 (2003) [hereinafter GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE],

available at http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/media/GoingWithoutReport.pdf
(finding that only one out of five unemployed workers who were eligible for COBRA coverage purchased it).
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she underwent a one-hour laparoscopic surgery to have her appendix removed. 3 7 She left the hospital forty-two hours after her arrival. 38
Ms. Nix learned two weeks later that her hospital bill would be over
$12,000.3 9 She applied for Medicaid, but was turned down because her
40
unemployment benefits exceeded Medicaid's monthly revenue limit.

When the hospital bill arrived about two months later, the total had
climbed to $13,110. 4 1 In addition, Ms. Nix received separate bills totaling
$5000 from the anesthesiologist and other doctors who had seen her at
the hospital. 42 A month later, an updated bill arrived from the hospital,
raising the total to $14,182 by adding a mandatory surcharge for New
York's bad debt and charity care pool. 43 This brought the total for the less
44
than two-day stay to more than $19,000.

While the White articles focused on the relentlessness and aggressiveness of Yale-New Haven's collections techniques, 45 the Nix article focused
46
on what the Journaltermed "a troubling fact of health-care economics."
While governmental programs like Medicare and Medicaid and private insurers pay steeply discounted rates that they negotiate with hospitals, patients who are not covered by healthcare programs or private insurers pay
47
full charges-i.e., the full retail price that hospitals set for their services.
37. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (detailing events of surgery).
38. See id. (stating length of hospital stay).
39. See id. (describing note from hospital estimating total bill).
40. See id. (explaining that under New York's Medicaid rules single person's
income cannot exceed $352 per month unless person is certified as disabled).
41. See id. (providing itemized list of charges incurred during hospital visit).
42. See id. (describing other doctors' bills incurred during hospital visit).
When contacted by Nix, the surgeon cut his $2500 bill to $1000. See id. (stating
this type of price-cutting was normally done by surgeon for uninsured patients).
This is still substantially more than the $589 he would receive from Medicare and
the $160 he would receive from Medicaid for the same procedure. See id. (comparing reimbursement rates).
43. See id. (quoting patient as stating: "Tack on another grand I can't pay, but
use it to help someone else"). New York's bad debt and charity care pool reimburses hospitals for a portion of their bad debt (bills that a hospital seeks to collect
but is unsuccessful in doing so) and charity care (bills that a hospital voluntarily
waives and does not seek to collect). See LONG ISLAND HEALTH ACCESS MONITORING
PROJECT, THE LONG ISLAND COALITION FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN, HOSPITAL
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AND FREE CARE PROGRAMS: AN INITIAL STUDY OF SEVEN LONG

13-14 (2001) [hereinafter STUDY OF SEVEN LONG ISLAND HospiTALs], available at http://www.communitycatalyst.org/resource.php?doc-id=380
ISLAND HOSPITALs

(explaining hospital indigent care pool in New York State); id. at 14 (explaining

sources of funds for pool and method of disbursement to hospitals); see also N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-k (McKinney 2002) (describing methodology of pool disbursements). The pool is funded by surcharges on patients' hospital bills. See N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2807-j (McKinney 2002) (stating guidelines for surcharges).
44. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (explaining charges).
45. For a further discussion of the White articles, see supra notes 23-32 and

accompanying text.
46. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33.
47. See id. (comparing charges billed by hospitals to uninsured with prices
accepted for patients covered by private insurance, Medicare and Medicaid).
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Through "the insanity of the system," uninsured patients, those who are
least able to pay, are charged at the highest point of the rate scale. 48 In
fact, these uninsured patients often pay twice, or even several times, the
rates being paid by state and federal programs and private health
49
insurers.
A later Journal article gave concrete comparisons between hospital
charges and the rates paid by governmental programs and private insurers. 50 This article told the story of Paul Shipman, an uninsured individual
who ended up spending twenty-one hours at the Inova Fairfax Hospital in
Fairfax, Virginia, when he experienced chest pains. 5 1 Mr. Shipman ended
52
up having a stent installed to prop open one of the arteries to his heart.

The Journal reported that as a result of this procedure, Mr. Shipman received a $29,500 hospital bill, plus a $1000 bill for the ambulance trip, a
$7000 bill from the cardiologist who performed the stent procedure and
53
several thousand dollars in additional bills for the emergency room visit.

The twenty-one hours of medical care cost Mr. Shipman nearly $40,000,
an exorbitant bill by any standard.
The Journal then compared the Shipman bills to what the hospital
would receive for the same services from private insurers, Medicare and
Medicaid. 54 While insurance plans might pay a "case based" rate (a flat
dollar amount corresponding to a given diagnosis that covers all of the
care the patient receives at the hospital), the uninsured receive a bill with
line by line charges for every item, down to band-aids and aspirins. 55 The
56
two systems of pricing result in huge differentials to the bills.

48. See id. (quoting Bruce Vladeck, who ran Medicare in 1990s).
49. See Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill; UninsuredPatients Often Face
Big Markups on Small Items; "RulesAre Completely Crazy", WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2004,
at BI [hereinafter Lagnado, Anatomy of a HospitalBill] (describing different rates
charged to uninsured, governmental plan beneficiaries and privately insured); see
also Hearing,supranote 1, at 20 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns
Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (stating that "[i]t is now
common for charges to be two to four times higher than costs"); THE LEGAL AID
Soc'y HEALTH LAW UNIT, STATE SECRET: How GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ENSURE THAT
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED PATIENTS HAVE ACCESS TO STATE CHARITY FUNDS 30
(2003) [hereinafter HEALTH LAW UNIT], available at http://www.legal-aid.org/

Uploads/BDCCReport.pdf (reporting that bill from St. Francis Hospital on Long
Island for 2003 emergency room services, where coverage was denied by patient's
insurer, was more than five times rate hospital would have accepted from insurer).

50. See Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill, supra note 49 (explaining rates).
51. See id. (recounting patient's medical condition that prompted hospital
stay).
52. See id. (retelling details of patient's stay in hospital).

53. See id. (elaborating on charges incurred from medical treatment).
54. See id. (comparing hospizal rates charged to uninsured persons with rates
charged to persons with government plan or private insurance coverage).
55. See id. (describing hospitals' line-by-line billing of full charges as similar to
d la carte billing by restaurants).
56. See id. (making billing comparison). Even on a line item basis, the rates
paid by governmental programs, for example, are much less than full charges. For
example, the Journal reported that Shipman's cardiologist's bill for installing the
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Further, the Journalillustrated the enormous gap between Mr. Shipman's charges and the hospital's actual costs. For example, the charge to
Mr. Shipman for the stent was $7560, compared to the manufacturer's
listed retail price of $3,195, a markup of 237%. 5 7 The hospital charged
Mr. Shipman $532.50 for three bottles of dye to image his arteries, while
the manufacturer sells the product to hospitals for twenty-eight dollars to
fifty dollars a bottle, a markup of at least 355%.58
In the fall of 2003, the Journalreported on two hospitals in Illinoisthe Carle Foundation Hospital 59 and Provena Covenant 6 0 -focusing on
their particularly heartless collections practices. Provena Covenant reportedly seized a large part of the retirement savings of Harold Quinn, a sixtyfive year old man whose insurance had expired only days before he was
forced to check into the hospital for abdominal pain from kidney stones. 6 1
A seven-day stay and one-day outpatient kidney stone removal procedure
left Mr. Quinn with a bill of $34,500, which was the hospital's full charge
for the care.

62

The same article also described a little known practice utilized by the
Carle Foundation ("Carle") known as "body attachment." 63 When uninsured patients whom Carle had sued for medical debts missed their court
appearances, Carle had them arrested and jailed, thereby requiring them
to pay bail before they could return home. 64 In one case, Carle had executed a body attachment on an uninsured part-time musician whose origistent was over $6800, whereas Medicaid would have paid the doctor only a little
over $1000 and Medicare would have paid only about $900. See id. (discussing
Shipman's billing). By these numbers, the cardiologist's charge to Mr. Shipman
was about seven times the rates the doctor would have accepted from Medicare or
Medicaid. See id. (comparing Shipman's bill to rates billed to average Medicare or
Medicaid patient).
57. See id. (comparing charges to costs).
58. See id. (discussing pricing differential). Due to the huge disparity between
costs and charges, some healthcare researchers have speculated whether hospitals
are actually making a profit off billing full charges to the uninsured. See, e.g., SEIU
Hosp. ACcoUNTABILrrY PROJECT, UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED: How ADVOCATE
HEALTH CARE OVERCHARGES CHICAGO HOSPITAL PATIENTS 9-11 (2003) [hereinafter

UNINSURED

AND

OVERCHARGED], availableat http://www.seiu.org/docUploads/Dis-

criminatoryPricing DPAdvocate.pdf (reporting that data on California hospitals show that some of them are profiting from uninsured collections).
59. See Lucette Lagnado, Medical Seizures: Hospitals Try Extreme Measures to Collect Their Overdue Debts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Lagnado,
Medical Seizures] (describing one patient's ordeal with Carle Foundation Hospital).
60. See Lucette Lagnado, How a Local Agency Challenged Hospitals' Collections
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at A8 (describing hospital's collections practices
against patient).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Lagnado, Medical Seizures, supra note 59.
64. See id. The Journalreported that Yale-New Haven Hospital had likewise
obtained at least sixty-five civil arrest warrants in the prior three years for debtors
who had missed court appearances. See id. Reportedly, body attachments are also
used in Indiana, Kansas, Michigan and Oklahoma to collect medical debt. See id.
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nal treatment at Carle was for a self-inflicted gunshot wound in a botched
suicide attempt.

65

The Journal articles on hospitals' treatment of the uninsured put a
personal face to the thousands of uninsured patients facing insurmountable hospital debt. Hospitals had not only failed to offer free or reduced
charges to these patients, but had actually charged them rates that far exceeded what the hospitals were readily accepting from governmental programs and private insurance. Moreover, the hospitals apparently availed
themselves of every legal means to make collections, including lawsuits,
liens on residences, arrests, jailings and monthly interest charges that exceeded the installment payments themselves so that some of these debts,
like Mr. White's, would continue to grow even when the debtor faithfully
made every payment. 6 6 The light that the Journal shone on these cruel
practices created a national sense of outrage over the treatment that supposedly charitable hospitals were giving to the uninsured.
III.

NUMEROUS REPORTS FIND THAT HOSPITALS GENERALLY WERE NOT
PROVIDING CHARrrY CARE TO THE UNINSURED

At about the same time that the Journalwas giving the public a dramatic picture of the devastating consequences of medical debt for the uninsured, a number of investigational reports were being published that
conclusively established the failure of hospitals to provide charity care to
this population. Although the researchers were examining hospitals located in different geographical areas, their findings were shockingly similar: hospitals did not tell the uninsured about charity care, did not offer
charity care, did not discount bills to the uninsured and aggressively pursued payment.
The reports consistently found that most hospitals did not tell uninsured patients about the availability of charity care. 67 It was extremely rare
(listing states that use arrest and jailing of patients who miss their court hearings
regarding their hospital debts).
65. See id. (providing example of particularly aggressive use of body
attachment)..
66. For a further discussion of Mr. White's medical bills, see supra notes 23-32
and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g.,
CMTv.ACCESS MONITORING SURVEY, THE ACCESS PROJECT, PAYING
FOR HEALTH CARE WHEN YOU'RE UNINSURED: How MUCH SUPPORT DOES THE SAFETY
NET OFFER? 2 (2003),
available at http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/
djfinreport.pdf (reporting that most hospital staffers "never offered to find out if
financial assistance was available"); CONN. CTR. FOR A NEW ECONOMY, UNCHARITABLE CARE: YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL'S CHARITY CARE AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES

20 (2003) [hereinafter UNCHARITABLE CARE], http://www.ctneweconomy.org/Publications/UC.pdf (explaining that debtors in study were mostly unaware of charitable programs offered by New Haven); STUDY OF SEVEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS,
supra note 43, at 8 (describing lack of information given to surveyors on free care
policies offered at seven hospitals studied); see also LONG ISLAND HEALTH ACCESS
MONITORING PROJECT, THE LONG ISLAND COALITION FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN,
HOSPITAL FREE CARE PROGRAM: A STUDY OF SIXTEEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS 2
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to locate hospitals having a well-defined policy of charity care that was explained to uninsured patients. 68 In fact, staffers at many hospitals were
unable or flatly refused to provide any information on free care 69 and
many hospitals mistakenly stated that free care was unavailable.70 Not surprisingly, most uninsured patients did not receive free care 7 1 or any sub72
stantial reduction to their hospital bills.
Compounding the problem, as confirmed by the researchers, was that
the surveyed hospitals all charged the uninsured full undiscounted
charges. For example, a study of Chicago area hospitals found that each
hospital charged uninsured patients up to twice the payments the hospitals accepted from insurance plans. 73 The researchers found that the vic74
tims of such "discriminatory pricing" were largely the working poor.
Due to the exorbitant rates, the average inpatient hospital bill for uninsured services often amounted to twenty-seven percent to fifty-nine percent of the median annual income within the locality, virtually
75
guaranteeing that the uninsured patient would be unable to pay the bill.
Even if the patient were not sued and thus managed to avoid the tacked
on court costs and legal fees, most hospitals charged interest that contin76
ued to accrue on unpaid portions of the bill.
(2003) [hereinafter STUDY OF SIXTEEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS], available at http:/
/www.communitycatalyst.org/resource.php?doc id=256 (explaining that not one
of sixteen hospitals surveyed informed patients of available free care for low income or uninsured).
68. See, e.g.,

STUDY OF SIXTEEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS,

supra note 67, at 2

(reporting that most hospitals surveyed did not inform surveyors that free care was
available to low income patients, and did not provide written free care policy).
69. See id. at 3 (reporting that at majority of hospitals surveyed, billing staff
did not know if free care was available).
70. See, e.g., STUDY OF SEVEN LONG ISLAND HOSPITALS, supra note 43, at 8.
71. See, e.g., UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED, supra note 58, at 3.
72. See id. at 2 (stating that financial assistance offered to uninsured most
often consisted of offer to allow payment of full bill in installments, rather than
discounting or waiving charges); see also Hearing,supra note 1, at 75 (statement of
Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and
Management) (explaining that it is difficult for uninsured to negotiate discounted
rates pre-treatment, because charges are per item, and parties do not know ahead
of time what items and services will be required).
73. See generally Hosp. ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT OF THE SERV. EMPLOYEES INT'L
UNION, WHY THE WORKING POOR PAY MORE: A REPORT ON THE DISCRIMINATORY
PRICING OF HEALTH CARE 1 (2003)

[hereinafter

WORKING POOR],

availableat http:/

/www.seiu.org/docUploads/Discriminatory-Pricing--whyworking-poor-paymore.pdf (finding that uninsured patients paid average of forty-eight percent
more than uninsured patients); UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED, supra note 58, at 2
(reporting substantially higher charges to uninsured).
74. See WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 2 (identifying victims of inflated pricing as those who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid, but too little to afford
private insurance).
75. See id. (describing disparities in bills to insured versus uninsured for emergency treatment and financial effect of such disparities on uninsured families).
76. See THE ACCESS PROJECT, THE CHAMPAIGN COUNT'Y HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS, HUMAN

SERVICES COAL. OF DADE COUNTY, TENANTS' AND WORKERS'
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Further, when hospitals reported their amounts of bad debt and charity care, they often reported in terms of charges, not CoStS. 7 7 This potena much
tially created a misconception that hospitals were shouldering
78
larger burden of charity care than they actually were.
Several of the studies also confirmed the Journalreports that exposed
the hospitals' relentless pursuit of collections from uninsured patients.
The most damning, titled Uncharitable Care, focused on Yale-New Haven
Hospital's practices of suing uninsured patients, garnishing their wages,
seizing their bank accounts and foreclosing on their homes, even when
relatively small amounts were at stake. 79 In one case, the hospital sued to
foreclose on a patient's home to collect a debt of only $4000.80
Other reports focused on the massive scope of the problem. The
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation reported that, according to Census Bureau figures, there were 41 million uninsured persons in the United States
in 2001.81 When persons who were uninsured for only a part of the year
COMM., THE CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT: EVIDENCE FROM THREE COMMUNITIES
18 (2003) [hereinafter CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT], available at http://www.

accessproject.org/downloads/med-eseng.pdf (reporting that often interest continued to accrue even when patient was making installment payments); see also
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY ILL. BD. OF REVIEW, NOTES ON EXEMPT APPLICATIONS 7 (2003),
available at http://www.co.champaign.il.us/SOAOFF/PROVENA.pdf (finding interest charges of 12.9% when patients financed their debt to Provena via financing

plan suggested by Provena through Capstone Bank, N.A.).
77. See, e.g., UNCHARITABLE CARE, supra note 67, at 12 (stating that value of

Yale-New Haven's bad debt and free care is reported in terms of charges, not at
hospital's cost of providing services).

78. See, e.g.,

UNINSURED AND OVERCHARGED,

supra note 58, at 10-11 (reporting

that Advocate Health Care "distorts the value of the charity care its hospitals provide by reporting charity care amounts as gross charges, rather than as the cost of
providing the care").
79. See UNCHARITABLE CARE, supra note 67, at 7 (describing aggressive collections practices by Yale-New Haven Hospital); see also CAROL PRYOR & ROBERT SEIFERT, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: How FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND HOSPITAL POLICIES CAN LEAVE PATIENTS IN DEBT 14 (2003) [hereinafter PRYOR, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES], available at http://www.accessproject.

org/downloads/unintended.pdf (reporting that in 2001, Yale-New Haven Hospital
"filed 134 new property liens in New Haven, almost 20 times the number filed by
the city's other hospital").
80. See UNCHARITABLE CARE, supra note 67, at 7 (describing case of Sondra
Henderson, among others, who was sued by Yale-New Haven Hospital in late 1990s
for approximately $4000, which she had incurred as uninsured admitted for heart
condition, where hospital ultimately won default foreclosure on her home, forcing
Henderson to pay $10,313, including interest, costs and legal fees to settle case and
retain residence).
81. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 1 (stating number of people in 2001 "who did not have any type of health insurance at any point
in time during the entire year"). The figure in New York City alone was over 1.8
million uninsured in 2001. See HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 7; see also CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND UNINSURED/

UNCOMPENSATED CARE IN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS 12 (2002), available at http://www.
crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2000s/2002/memolO6l.pdf (reporting that "[t]here are
indications that numbers [of Michigan uninsured] may be on the rise again [after
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were considered, the figure rose to approximately 74.7 million under the
age of sixty-five, or nearly one out of every three persons. 8 2 Surprisingly,
nearly four out of five individuals who went without health insurance during 2001-2002 were employed, 83 confirming the findings of other studies
that it is predominantly the working poor, not the unemployed, who go
84
without health insurance.
The reports also confirmed that the consequences of medical debt on
the uninsured caused substantial changes in their lives. Medical debtors
found it difficult to obtain bank loans and credit cards; worked longer
hours to meet their basic needs; and battled stress, anxiety and "feelings of
hopelessness." 85 A study of healthcare on Long Island found that the uninsured often did not get needed medical care because they could not
afford it. 8 6 A study of the Chicago area found that the uninsured were
often denied access due to providers' requirements that the uninsured pay
cash up-front or due to providers' refusals to treat because of outstanding
bills. 8 7 Ironically, the denial of access to medical care for the uninsured
often resulted in their use of more costly hospital emergency depart2001] as a result of the weakened economy and the rising cost of health
insurance").
82. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 1 (noting that
almost two-thirds of individuals in study were uninsured for six months or more);
see also Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Diana DeGette, Member, H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations)
(noting that forty-three to eighty-one million Americans go without health insurance for at least part of year).
83. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 5 (observing
that most uninsured were employed).
84. See, e.g., WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 2 (reporting that sixty-four percent of uninsured adults in Illinois in 2001 were employed).
85. See CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 76, at 18-21 (providing
testimonials from individuals affected by large medical debt).
86. See generally LONG ISLAND HEALTH ACCESS MONITORING PROJECT, THE LONG
ISLAND COAL. FOR A NAT'L HEALTH PLAN, NEGLECTED AND INVISIBLE: UNDERSTANDING THE UNMET HEALTHCARE NEEDS OF PEOPLE ON LONG ISLAND 32 (2002) [hereinafter

NEGLECTED

AND

INVISIBLE],

available at http://www.accessproject.org/

downloads/_DI%2OFinal%2OReport45.pdf (describing uninsureds' need for medical services, prescription drugs and dental coverage). Some researchers have
noted that hospitals' debt and collections activities can adversely affect patients'
health. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 28 (statement of Melissa B. Jocoby, Associate
Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (noting that " [ slome researchers are concerned specifically about the negative impact of indebtedness
and related financial trouble on certain diseases and conditions").
87. See CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 76, at 13 (detailing various bars to access to medical treatment); see also HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49,
at 35 (reporting that eight of twenty-two New York hospitals interviewed regularly
asked uninsured patients to pay 100% of their anticipated bill prior to admission).
A financial representative from New York University Hospital has been quoted as
saying that "people have to pay for the services they receive here ... [and] if they
can't pay, they have to just get the hell out!" See id. at 20; see also PRYOR, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 3 (reporting on study where more than
half of low-income healthcare consumers with medical debts told researchers that
their medical debts made it harder for them to get medical care, as providers re-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss1/11

12

2006]

Cohen: The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured - No Villa
CONTROVERSY OVER HosPiTAL CHARGES

ments, 88 where the hospitals are required to screen and treat by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTAIA).89
One of the more influential reports, by The Commonwealth Fund,
was unique in suggesting regulatory causes for the hospitals' billing full
charges to the uninsured. 90 The report stated that federal fraud and
abuse laws aimed at preventing overbilling to the Medicare system may
have inadvertently inhibited hospitals from offering reduced charges and
from forgiving debt.9 1 The report, however, also faulted hospitals for failing to have formal policies for identifying and connecting uninsured patients to programs that were available to provide free or reduced-cost
care.

92

Several reports were especially critical of New York's bad debt and
charity care system. 9 3 While New York hospitals can recover a portion of
their bad debts and charity care from a statewide pool, 94 there are no
requirements for hospitals to alert patients to the existence of the pool or
to provide minimal levels of charity care. 9 5 Not only do New York hospiquired cash pre-payment, refused care or encouraged them to go to other
providers).
88. See GOING WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 14 (stating that
uninsured adults are four times more likely to use emergency room for care); NE-

supra note 86, at 27, 32 (finding that more than half of
respondents who reported family use of emergency room said it was due to lack of
insurance or inability to pay).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000) (requiring hospitals to provide medical
screening exam to determine whether emergency condition exists when patients
come to hospital emergency department and make request for treatment, and if
emergency condition is identified, requiring hospital to provide stabilizing treatment within its capability, or to transfer patient to another facility that can provide
such treatment).
90. See PRYOR, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 4 (suggesting
regulatory reasons for hospitals' uninsured billing practices).
91. See id. (referring to Medicare rules that prohibit providers from waiving
collection and require providers to set uniform fees).
92. See generally id. at 12-18 (describing shortfalls in hospitals' billing
practices).
93. See generally HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 8-13 (describing New
York State laws governing hospital bad debt and charity care and explaining how
system fails to aid uninsured patients); PUB. POLICY AND EDUC. FUND OF N.Y., HosPGLECTED AND INVISIBLE,

TAL FREE CARE: CAN NEW YORKERS ACCESS HOSPITAL SERVICES PAID FOR BY OUR TAX
DOLLARS? 14-24 (2003) [hereinafter NEW YORK HOSPITAL FREE CARE],available at

http://www.communitycatalyst.org/resource.php?doc-id=177 (analyzing data collected in survey of New York hospitals and showing failure of hospitals to provide
charity care).
94. See HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 20 (reporting that pool distributions for 2001 covered approximately fifty percent of hospitals' cost of providing
uncompensated care); NEW YoRK HOSPITAL FREE CARE, supra note 93, at 25 (stating
that seventy hospitals surveyed received more than $400 million from New York's
bad debt and charity care pool).
95. See NEW YoRK HOSPITAL FREE CARE, supra note 93, at 27-28. The source
reports:
New York State spent $847 million dollars a year [for 2002-2003] through
the HCRA Indigent Care and High Need Indigent Care Adjustment
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tals bill the uninsured an added tax for the state's bad debt and charity
care pool, 96 but when the hospital collects from the pool to compensate it
for a portion of its uncollected bills, those collections never get credited to
specific patients. 9 7 This enables New York hospitals to continue to pursue
uninsured patients for collection even after the hospitals have collected
from the pool to compensate them, at least in part, for those uncollected
debts.

98

IV. HOSPITAL CHARGES-How THEY ARE DETERMINED, WHY THEY ARE
So HIGH AND THE INEQUITY THIS PRODUCES FOR THE UNINSURED

Historically, hospitals set their charges in much the same manner as
any other industry. They had discretion to set whatever charges they determined would be sufficient to cover their costs and give them a predetermined level of profit, keeping in mind the charges sought by competing
hospitals in their local markets. 9 9 Beginning in the early 1980s, however,
managed care plans began demanding negotiated discounts. 10 0 In many
Pools, but there is no accountability by hospitals on how many uninsured
and underinsured individuals they treat as a result of receiving funds
from the pools .... [T]here is no real basis for determining whether they
provide care to the neediest patients.
Id.; see also HEALTH LAw UNIT, supra note 49, at 9 ("Hospitals do not have to actually provide access to free or reduced fee care funds to individual uninsured or
underinsured patients in exchange for these [bad debt and charity care pool]
funds.").
96. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2807j (McKinney 2002) (requiring
surcharges to be paid for services provided to all non-Medicare patients); see also
Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (reporting that New York Methodist Hospital's
bill for uninsured patient Rebekah Nix included tax of $1072 for bad debt and
charity care pool contribution).
97. See HEALTH LAW UNIT, supra note 49, at 2 (describing how hospitals' receipt of bad debt and charity care funds from state pool does not benefit individual uninsured).
98. See id. at 11 (providing illustration wherein uninsured patient is pursued
by hospital for full charges, even though hospital collects fifty percent of its costs
from state's pool). New York has also come under fire for a state law that allows
debt collectors, acting on the hospitals' behalf, to go after old court judgments
against patients and attach their bank accounts electronically. See Lucette
Lagnado, Cold-Case Files: Dunnedfor Old Bills, Poor Find Some Hospitals Never Forget,
WALL ST. J., June 8, 2004, at Al (describing New York law that allows electronic
attachment of bank accounts). See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a), (g) (McKinney
Supp. 2001) (describing statutory process for debt collection by use of restraining
notice).
99. See, e.g., Lucette Lagnado, Medical Shift: Hospitals Will Give Price Breaks to
Uninsured, if Medicare Agrees, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at Al [hereinafter
Lagnado, Medical Shift] (stating that in 1960s, "hospital charges generally reflected
the cost of providing care plus a modest profit"); see also Hearing,supranote 1, at 19
(statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital,
Finance and Management) (noting that in 1960s and 1970s hospitals had "complete discretion" to establish their charges).
100. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (explaining
that in early 1980s managed care plans began negotiating discounts off hospitals'
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cases, these negotiated rates for managed care plans were expressed as
percentage discounts off charges. 1 1
In the mid-1980s Medicare and Medicaid largely converted to "case
based" rates of payment, whereby they paid hospitals one set price for all
services rendered to an inpatient with a particular diagnosis. 10 2 Although
the case based methodology was not related to the hospitals' charges, the
governmental programs still used charges to calculate payments for "outlier" cases, i.e., cases where complications required, for example, a longer
inpatient stay or a more intensive use of hospital resources, thereby ren10 3
dering the case based rate inadequate.
For the past twenty years, health insurers, managed care plans and
governmental programs have all sought to drive down their rates for hospital care, 10 4 which often comprises the largest segment of expense for
healthcare insurers. 10 5 Because the hospital rates payable by health insur-

ers, managed care plans and governmental programs (covering the majority of hospitals' patients) 10 6 were not full charges and often times were
quite a bit less than the hospitals' charge levels, there was little incentive
for state or federal governments to regulate charges. 10 7 Additionally,
charges in return for placing hospitals in plans' networks); see also Lucette
Lagnado, Medical Markup: CaliforniaHospitals Open Books, Showing Huge Price Differences, WALL ST.J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Lagnado, MedicalMarkup] (stating that during 1990s HMOs demanded "steep discounts off retail prices" from
hospitals).
101. See, e.g., Hearing,supranote 1, at 114 (statement ofJack 0. Bovender, Jr.,
Chairman and CEO, the Hospital Corporation of America) (providing that many
negotiated rates with managed care providers are based on discounts off charges).
102. See, e.g., Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (reporting that beginning in
mid-1980s Medicare started basing payments on standardized diagnostic codes related to patients' diagnoses rather than to hospitals' charges).
103. See Marilyn Werber Serafini, Sticker Shock, 35 NAT'LJ. 3180 (2003) (stating that Medicare pays extra outlier payments for sickest patients who accrue highest charges).
104. See, e.g., Hearing,supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson,
Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (acknowledging that by 1990, federal and state governments, private insurers and
managed care plans were no longer paying charges to hospitals, but were instead
using case based rate methodologies or negotiating discounts with hospitals).
105. See
SYSTEM

RAND

E.

ROSENBLATr ET AL.,

LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE

467-68 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1997) (stating that hospitals receive

largest portion of money spent on healthcare).
106. See id. at 468 (explaining that in 1993 hospitals received 36% of their
revenues from private insurers, 28% from Medicare, 13% from Medicaid, 15%
from other federal programs, 5% from philanthropic or non-patient income and
only 3% from patients directly).
107. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (indicating
that when federal and state governments, private insurers and managed care plans
ceased paying full charges by 1990, "the regulatory and market constraints on hospital charges were virtually eliminated"). For example, before New York deregulated hospital rates in 1997, charges could not be more than twenty percent above
the case based rates payable by commercial insurers. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
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there was little incentive for the hospitals to decrease their charges because many of the negotiated rates continued to be structured as discounts
off charges. 10 8 High charges could also trigger extra outlier payments
from Medicare, encouraging hospitals to keep their charges high. 109 As a
result, charges continued to climb.
As such, the only patient group that did not benefit from the drive
down of hospital rates was the uninsured. 110 The employed population
largely came to receive health insurance benefits through their employers'
health benefit plans."1 The age sixty-five and older population became
covered by Medicare.' 12 The extremely indigent often met the state's cri§ 2807-c(1)(c) (McKinney 2002) (stating statutory limits for charge based payments). Now, nearly nine years post-deregulation, according to the Greater New
York Hospital Association, charges average eighty-seven percent above hospitals'
costs. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (describing "ballooned" charges by
hospitals well beyond cost of providing treatment). Hospital charges in California
have reportedly reached 178% above costs. See id. Most states currently have average hospital charges of at least 100% above costs. See Serafini, supra note 103
(comparing average state hospital charges to costs for the years 1997 and 2002;
noting that hospital charges, for the most part, greatly outweighed hospital costs).
In contrast, in Maryland, where hospital charges are still regulated, charges average only twenty-eight percent above costs. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33
(highlighting lower hospital charges in state that regulates hospital rates).
108. See PRYOR, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 17 (reporting
that hospitals' use of charges as basis for negotiating discounts with public and
private insurers may lead hospitals to keep charges high); Lagnado, Medical Shift,
supra note 99 (stating that hospitals began boosting their charges in 1980s "as an
effort to set a higher starting point for negotiations [with HMOs]").
109. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 127-28 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations) (indicating that outliers were reimbursed by Medicare on ratio formula with cost as numerator and charge as denominator, creating
incentive for hospitals to set their charges as high as possible); Serafini, supra note
103 (stating that to determine whether particular patient qualifies as outlier, Medicare determines difference between hospital's charges and costs, but as cost lists
used by Medicare were two years old, hospital could increase charges to create
greater difference between costs and charges, triggering outlier payment). In August of 2003, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services changed its outlier
reimbursement rules to remove the troubling incentive, creating a system where
rapid increases in gross charges do not increase outlier payments. See Hearing,
supra note 1, at 142-43 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare
Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services) (providing that new regulations "tighten the time
period between costs and charges" so that hospitals no longer have the opportunity "to accelerate charges because of. . . incentives in the Medicare program").
110. See Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99 (reporting that uninsured were
"[l] ost in the mix," billed at full charges, unaware of discounted rates and with no
one to negotiate discounts for them).
111. See ROSENBLAT-r ET AL., supra note 105, at 38 (stating that most important
determinant of health insurance coverage was employment, with nearly two-thirds
of non-elderly having employment-based coverage).
112. See id. at 369-70 (asserting that generally, Medicare Part A (covering hospital services) covers individuals who are age sixty-five or older and who have paid
social security taxes for at least ten years).
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teria to qualify for Medicaid.' 1 3 All these groups paid discounted hospital
rates or case based rates. 1 14 A portion of the middle class, however, either
newly unemployed or not covered by an employer sponsored health benefit plan, did not qualify for Medicaid and was not old enough to be covthat was
ered by Medicare. It was only this group of uninsured patients
11 5
left to pay full charges when they received hospital services.
V.

NATION-WIDE WAVE OF CLASS ACTIONS CHALLENGES HOSPITALS'

UNINSURED BILLING

AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES

Beginning in the summer of 2004, uninsured patients across the
United States commenced a number of class action lawsuits against hospitals alleging excessive charges and overly aggressive collections prac117
the
tices. 116 The litigations were coordinated by Richard F. Scruggs,
in
plaintiffs
represented
successfully
had
who
attorney
Mississippi,
Oxford,
the tobacco class actions.1 18 ByJanuary 2005, more than seventy such lawsuits had been commenced in federal courts in more than forty states, with

113. According to the New York State Department of Health's Website, a single individual may qualify for Medicaid if he or she receives no more than $667 in

income per month. See N.Y. State Dep't of Health, Medicaid, http://www.health.
state.ny.us/health_care/medicaid/index.htm#qualify (last visited Nov. 12, 2005)
(presenting Medicaid eligibility chart).
114. For example, the standard 2003 charge for a hysterectomy at North
Shore University Hospital in Manhasset, New York, was $21,508; however, Medicaid paid $8456, Medicare paid $7600 and private insurers and HMOs paid approximately the same rate as Medicare. See Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99
(describing differences in billing insured versus uninsured patients).
115. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Diana DeGette, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations) (noting that "the uninsured are the only ones who have no advocate [to
negotiate a discounted hospital rate]"). Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard
Law School has accurately summarized the current situation, stating: "there is no
one to negotiate on behalf of people without insurance." See UNINSURED AND
OVERCHARGED, supra note 58, at 7 (quoting Professor Elizabeth Warren).
116. See generally PendingLitigation: NonProfit Hospital Charity Care Litigation, 13
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1555, 1555-75 (2004) (providing chart summarizing status
of charity care class action lawsuits filed in federal district courts as of October
2004).
117. See Charity Care Litigation Sees New Filing as Defense's Theories, Strategies
Evolve, 13 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1318, 1318 (2004) (describing Scruggs' coordinating role in class actions).
118. See Charity Care Class Action Litigation Is Denied Federal Status, 17 HEALTH
LAW 1, 1 (2005) (discussing Scruggs' involvement in charity care and tobacco class
action litigations).
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more than 600 hospitals named as defendants. 1 19 Dozens of similar class
120
actions were also commenced in state forums.
For the most part, the various state and federal complaints made the
same allegations. The chief claim was that by receiving federal charitable
tax exemption under § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 1 21 the
hospitals had entered into an express or implied contract with the federal
119. See NFP Litigation Update:Early Decisions by Federal CourtsFavor Hospitals, 14
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 79, 79 (2005) (providing update on statute of charity care
class actions); PendingLitigation:NonProfit HospitalCharity Care Litigation,supra note
116, at 1555 (summarizing status of lawsuits filed in federal courts against not-forprofit hospitals); see also MultidistrictJudicialPanel Rejects Motion to Consolidate,Transfer Charity Care Cases, 13 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1533, 1533 (2004) (reporting on
new rulings in charity care class actions).
Yale-New Haven Hospital was particularly hard hit. Not only was it targeted by
the Journalarticles, but it was also sued in February 2003 by the Connecticut Attorney General for hoarding "free bed funds" by failing to distribute the funds to
uninsured patients in need of charity care. See Attorney General Sues New Haven
Hospital Over Failure to Use Indigent-CareDonations, 12 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 319,
319 (2003) (reporting on lawsuit); David M. Herszenhorn, Connecticut Sues YaleNew Haven Hospital, Saying It HoardedMoney Donatedfor the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2003, at B5 (discussing lawsuit). For a further discussion on the Journal's expos6
on Yale-New Haven Hospital's treatment of uninsured patients, see supra notes 2332, 45 and accompanying text. In December 2003, the hospital was sued in state
court by the Service Employees International Union 1199 (New England) for allegedly overcharging low-income patients and harassing them for payment. See Connecticut: Hospitals Sued for Misuse of Indigent Care Funds, Am. HEALTH LINE, Dec. 17,
2003, at "In The Courts" (reporting on lawsuit). That same month, Yale-New Haven hospital was again sued in state court by a class of plaintiffs alleging misuse of
its free bed funds. See generally Ahmad v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. UWYCV-04-0183725-s (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003), available at http://www.jud2.
state.ct.us/civil_inquiry/DispDetail.asp?DocNum=WY-CV-04-0183725-S (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) (providing information regarding pending litigation). In September 2004, the hospital was sued by a class of plaintiffs in Connecticut's federal
district court alleging excessive charges and aggressive collections practices. See
generally Complaint at 10, Rivera v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1515
(D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2005) (presenting class action complaint against Yale-New Haven
Hospital). This case, however, was dismissed five months after filing. See Claims
Against Yale-New Haven Hospital Dismissed in Oral Ruling by Federal Court, 14 Health
L. Rep. (BNA) 241, 241 (2005) (reporting that U.S. District Court for District of
Connecticut, in oral ruling issued on February 8, 2005, granted defendants' motion to dismiss).
120. See MultidistrictJudicialPanel Rejects Motion to Consolidate, Transfer Charity
Care Cases, supra note 119, at 1533 (stating that as of fall 2004, approximately forty
additional state court actions had been filed).
121. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (2000). The statute provides that an organization may be exempt from taxation if it is:
[O]rganized and operated exclusively for... charitable... purposes, ....
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation
...and which does not participate in, or intervene in ... any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
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government obliging them to provide charity care. 12 2 Plaintiffs alleged
that when they were billed excessive charges for hospital services and were
aggressively pursued by the hospitals for collection, the hospitals were in
breach of their charitable obligations.1 23 Plaintiffs also asserted various
state and federal claims against the hospitals for breach of express or implied charitable duties, 124 breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, 125 breach of charitable trust 126 and unjust enrichment, 12 7 but these
claims were premised, at least in part, upon the same legal theory that the
hospitals' charitable tax exemption under § 501(c) (3) created an express
128
or implied contract with the government to furnish charity care.
Various plaintiffs asserted additional federal claims. Some alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 129 asserting
that the hospital's "aggressive, abusive and humiliating collection practices" were prohibited by the FDCPA. 130 Others asserted violations of EMTALA,1 3 1 based on the hospitals' alleged insistence that the plaintiffs sign
payment guarantees before receiving emergency treatment. 13 2 Some
plaintiffs asserted civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
violations of the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 133 claiming that the hospitals had engaged in invidious discrimination against uninsured patients by charging them more than in122. See, e.g.,
Complaint 27, Carlson v. Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., No. CV
04-3086 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2004) (alleging existence of express or implied contract
under 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3) as bases of breach of contract claims).
123. See id. 11 30-36, 70-79 (elaborating on alleged breaches of charitable
duties).
124. See id. 11 70-79.
125. See id. 11 80-83.
126. See id. 11 88-92.
127. See id. 11 98-101.
128. See id. (explaining that basis for all claims stemmed from reading
§ 501 (c) (3) as creating express or implied contract between hospitals and government to furnish charity care in exchange for tax exemption).
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000) (targeting unfair collections procedures by
independent debt collectors).
130. See, e.g., Complaint 1 86, Carlson,No. CV 04-3086 (arguing that Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibited hospitals' collections practices).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000) (prohibiting hospitals from, inter alia, denying or delaying emergency screening and treatment). For a further discussion
of Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), see supra note
89.
132. See, e.g., Complaint 11 135-39, Rivera v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., No.
3:04-CV-1515 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2005).
133. See U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV,§ 1 (providing due process protection).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "nor shall any person...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .

. . ."

U.S.

CONsT. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that
"no state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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sureds for the same services. 1 3 4 Finally, plaintiffs asserted various state law
claims, such as breach of express contracts 135 and violations of state consumer fraud statutes.1 3 6 Plaintiffs named the American Hospital Association (AHA) as an additional defendant, alleging that the AHA had
conspired with the hospitals and aided and abetted the alleged
13 7

breaches.

VI.

HOSPITALS AND HHS FACE OFF AT THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING ON
HOSPITALS' BILLING AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES

In the summer of 2003, the House Energy and Commerce Committee
commenced an investigation of hospital billing and collections practices,
sending letters to twenty hospitals and hospital systems nationwide asking
detailed questions about their charity care policies. 138 A year later, the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations convened a hearing on the
problem, taking testimony from a number of health policy researchers,
hospital industry representatives and representatives from the Centers for

Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).

13 9

The researchers reiterated their findings regarding the magnitude of
the problem of medical debt for the uninsured. 140 Further, they confirmed that hospital reimbursement methodologies incentivized hospitals
134. See, e.g., Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 498
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (discussing plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim).
135. See id. at 499 (detailing plaintiffs' breach of contract claim).
136. See, e.g., Complaint
93-97, Carlson v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
No. CV 04-3086 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2004) (asserting violations of New York's consumer fraud law); see also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004) (prohibiting
deceptive business practices). Moreover, others of plaintiffs' various common law
claims, such as breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, could also be
premised upon principles of New York common law. See, e.g., Complaint
80-83,
Carlson, No. CV 04-3086 (asserting claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing).
137. See Complaint
43-46, 102-116, Carlson, No. CV 04-3086 (alleging that
American Hospital Association (AHA) conceals and misrepresents amount of charity care provided by its member hospitals and that it falsely asserts that its billing is
required by Medicare regulations).
138. See Lucette Lagnado, House Panel Begins Inquiry into Hospital Billing Practices, WALL ST. J.,July 17, 2003, at BI (recounting investigation of hospital billing
and collections practices commenced by House Committee).

139. See Hearing,supra note 1, at III (listing names of witnesses appearing at
hearing, including: researchers from the Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital Finance and Management; The Commonwealth Fund; the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law; the Access Project; hospital representatives from
Hospital Corporation of America, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Catholic Health
Initiatives, New York Presbyterian Hospital, and Ascension Health; representatives
of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); and representatives of Office of Inspector General (OIG)).
140. See id. at 15 (statement of Rep. Allen, Member, House Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations) (asserting that medical debt is leading cause of personal bankruptcy in United States).
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to retain high charges and that states' deregulation of hospital rates
largely had removed charges from governmental limitations. 141
Representatives of the hospital industry defended their charity care
practices, emphasizing that they ended up "writing off' most uninsured
bills. 1 42 The hospitals also explained that most of their managed care contracts were structured as percentage discounts off charges; thus, lowering
charges would have huge impacts on all of the managed care rates col1 43
lected by the hospitals, not just their rates to the uninsured.
The hospitals' primary defense at the hearing, set forth in a white
paper produced by the AHA, 144 was that federal regulations governing
Medicare had restricted the hospitals' ability to lower charges for the uninsured and underinsured, and to forgive their debts.' 45 The AHA argued
that Medicare billing rules require a uniform charge structure for all patients. 146 Although there are exceptions to the uniform charge rule to
allow hospitals to discount charges to needy Medicare beneficiaries, the
AHA argued that fulfilling the requirements to qualify for the exceptions
is onerous and uncertain. 147 The hospitals must either assume "considera-

ble administrative burdens" and obtain prior approval from CMS agents or
make detailed and verified financial findings to support their identification of Medicare beneficiaries as indigent. 1 48 Further, in order to receive
payments from Medicare for cost sharing amounts that hospitals have
been unable to collect from Medicare beneficiaries, the hospitals must engage in "reasonable collection efforts" which are uniform for all pa-

tients. 149 The "reasonable collection efforts" required by Medicare have
come to be defined through Medicare audits as rather aggressive collections practices. 150 The ALA also noted that CMS and the OIG had vigorously enforced the Medicare bad debt rules, subjecting hospitals to
141. See id. at 16, 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (opining reasons for excessive charges).
142. See id. at 98 (statement of Herbert Pardes, President and CEO of New
York Presbyterian Hospital) (explaining that New York Presbyterian Hospital
writes off $70 million in bad debt each year).
143. See id. at 92 (statement ofJack 0. Bovender, Jr., Chairman and CEO, the
Hospital Corporation of America).
144. See id. at 240-53 (presenting document submitted by AlA, setting forth
various hospital defenses to alleged inappropriate billing and collections
practices).
145. See id. (providing AHA's primary defense offered to support hospitals'
alleged inappropriate billing and collections practices against uninsured patients).
146. See id. at 241 (presenting AHA's defense that Medicare does not permit
hospitals to lower charges for uninsured).
147. See id. at 245-46 (detailing difficulties in complying with exceptions to
uniform charge requirement).
148. See id. (noting tasks required to be performed by hospitals to utilize uniform patient charge exception).
149. See id. at 246 (discussing Medicare debt collection rules).
150. See id. at 241-42 (stating that Medicare reviews and audits have shaped
definition of reasonable collection efforts).
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expensive and time consuming audit appeals whenever Medicare challenged the hospitals' lack of sufficient substantiation of indigence or insufficient collection efforts. 15 ' In addition, the AHA stated that the federal
anti-kickback law' 52 and a Fraud Alert issued by the OIG warning hospitals
about routinely waiving Medicare deductibles and copayments 153 chilled
hospitals' willingness to discount charges or forgive debt for Medicare
beneficiaries. 1 5 4 Therefore, the AHA concluded that the Medicare rules,
albeit "inadvertently," had discouraged hospitals from creating across-theboard exemptions for uninsured or underinsured patients and from being
155
more lenient in collections.
In response, the OIG flatly denied any basis to contend that the Medicare rules or fraud and abuse laws prohibited hospitals from offering discounts to the uninsured and underinsured. 15 6 With regard to the
uninsured, the OIG stated:
Frankly, we do not know why lawyers advising hospitals would tell
them that the fraud and abuse laws are an impediment to discounts to the uninsured. Such discounts do not violate the fraud
and abuse laws. We have never taken any enforcement action in
1 7
this area. 5
CMS also asserted that while Medicare reimbursement could be affected
by hospitals' charge levels, charges are currently utilized as a basis for
Medicare payment only in very limited circumstances.158 Moreover, debts
could be forgiven for Medicare beneficiaries as long as the hospitals com151. See id. at 246-50.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000) (prohibiting remuneration to hospitals
for referrals for services under federal health care program). The federal antikickback law states:
Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health
care program.
Id.
153. See OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,375 (Dec. 19, 1994)
(discussing waiver of Medicare copayments).
154. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 251-52 (stating that anti-kickback laws incentivized hospitals to aggressively seek payment from uninsured).
155. See id. at 240-41 (asserting that Medicare regulations prohibited hospitals
from offering more lenient billing and collections procedures for uninsured).
156. See id. at 136 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 133-34 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare
Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services) (stating that most providers are currently reimbursed
under "prospective payment" methodology where charges are not considered).
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plied with the anti-kickback waiver requirements, which require only that
the waivers not be advertised or routinely given and that the hospital make
159
a case-by-case finding of need.
As of the date of this writing, the congressional probe into hospitals'
charity care practices is continuing.1 60 In April 2005, the House Energy
and Commerce Committee sent additional requests for information to ten
159. See id. at 135-36 (referring, apparently, to civil monetary penalty statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2000), which authorizes CMS to impose civil monetary penalties for Medicare fraud, but which excepts any waivers of coinsurance and deductible amounts that are unadvertised, non-routine and pursuant to
individualized determination of financial need or after failure of reasonable collection efforts).
160. See Witnesses Tell Senate Finance Committee Nonprofit Health Care Needs More
Oversight, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 493, 493 (2005) (reporting on Finance Committee's April 2005 hearing on charitable tax exemptions for hospitals). The recent congressional hearing before the Senate Finance Committee addressed the
need for greater oversight of charitable healthcare organizations as part of a proposed nonprofit taxation reform. See id. (reporting that witnesses testified that any
nonprofit taxation reform legislation should provide for greater oversight of charitable healthcare organizations). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue testified
that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) needs more flexibility to penalize charitable abuses and specifically noted that charitable healthcare entities may not sacrifice their charitable purposes for the sake of profit. See id. (stating that Mark
Everson, IRS Commissioner, argued that IRS needs more resources to address
nonprofit tax exemption issues). The IRS has reportedly sent letters to approximately 2000 nonprofit organizations (including healthcare organizations) asking
the nonprofits to demonstrate that they are in compliance with IRS guidelines for
establishing reasonable compensation for their executives and board members.
See Nonprofit Health Care Entities Gear up to Respond to IRS Compensation Audits, 14
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 629, 629 (2005) (discussing problems nonprofit healthcare
organizations may encounter in responding to audit letters). On May 25, 2005,
the Senate Finance Committee sent letters to ten hospital systems asking for information about charitable activities, patient billing and ventures with for-profit entities, seeking to discover whether "the benefits [the hospitals] provide to the needy
justify the tax breaks they receive." See Press Release, Senate Fin. Comm., Grassley
Asks Non-Profit Hospitals to Account for Activities Related to Their Tax-exempt
Status (May 25, 2005), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/
prg052505.pdf (including text of letter).
In May 2005, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings to examine whether tax-exempt hospitals should be subjected to improved congressional oversight and increased IRS enforcement. See generally A Review of the TaxExempt Hospital Sector: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th
Cong. 1-8 (May 26, 2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.
asp?formmode=view&id-3193 (presenting testimony regarding oversight of tax exemption requirements for hospitals). The stated goal of the hearing was to examine "what is the taxpayer getting in return for the tens of billions of dollars per
year in tax subsidy." See id. at 3. The Committee considered a recently released
General Accounting Office (GAO) study which had found that "current tax policy
lacks specific criteria with respect to tax exemptions for charitable entities and
detail on how that tax exemption is conferred." See id. at 7-8 (citing recent GAO
study).
According to a work plan released by the IRS on October 26, 2005, the IRS
will continue to focus on whether tax-exempt hospitals are furnishing sufficient
community benefits to warrant their exemption. The IRS intends to send compliance check letters to hospitals on this and related matters in 2006. See IRS Predicts
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leading hospitals, this time seeking explanations of how hospital charges
are "presented, explained, and understood by the medical consumer"1 6 '
and "how patients ...

VII.

are affected by ... high prices for services."'

AN EVALUATION OF THE HOSPITALS' AND

HHS'

62

POSITIONS

While there is no question that many hospitals have not acted charitably with regard to uninsured patients,1 63 it also appears that, contrary to
the denials by HHS, 164 hospitals had legitimate reasons for believing that
lowering charges for the uninsured and underinsured or failing to take
aggressive collections activities would expose themselves to regulatory risk.
CMS's and the OIG's Advisory Opinions, Bulletins, Fraud Alerts, audit
findings and even their express statements at the congressional hearing
support the hospitals' position that waiving cost sharing or forgiving debt
created regulatory risk. Although the hospitals' defenses with regard to
the uninsured are substantially weaker than their defenses regarding
Medicare beneficiaries, there are some legitimate bases supporting the
hospitals' reluctance to discount charges or forgive debt.
There is substantial evidence that with regard to indigent Medicare
beneficiaries, cost sharing waivers can create exposure under the federal
fraud and abuse laws. On December 19, 1994, the OIG published a Fraud
Alert warning that the routine waiver of copayments or deductibles under
Focus on Nonprofit Hospitals in Letter, Initiatives Plan Issued for FY 2006, 14 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) 1413, 1413 (2005).
161. See House Committee Seeks More Data on Hospital Charges, Billing Clarity, 14
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 579, 580 (2005) (presenting letter written by House Energy
and Commerce Committee to hospitals, which explains that committee is "examining how clear, accurate, and accessible these important [bills and explanations of
charges] are to patients"); see also Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives,
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Comm. Expands Inquiry into Hosp. Billing Sys.
(Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/
04262005_1504.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Committee Expands Inquiry] (discussing House Energy and Commerce Committee's review of "overly complex"
hospital bills).
162. See House Committee Seeks More Data on Hospital Charges, Billing Clarity,
supra note 161, at 580. The letter to the hospitals stated that the Committee was
looking at balance billing for out-of-network patients (patients who receive treatments at hospitals that have not negotiated discounts with the patients' insurance
plans) and rates for property/casualty insurers, which "may be paying medical benefits under their policies at or close to the full charge master rates." See Press
Release, Committee Expands Inquiry, supra note 161 (providing text of letter sent
to hospitals).
163. For a discussion of news articles and research findings reporting that
hospitals did not advise uninsured patients of charity care that was available to
them, did not negotiate reduced charges or reasonable payment plans, charged
unreasonably high interest and took extremely aggressive collections actions, such
as foreclosure of the patients' residences or body attachments, see supra notes 2398 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the denials by Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), see supra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
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Medicare Part B exposed a provider to anti-kickback risk. 165 The OIG
stressed that while cost sharing amounts could be forgiven where the provider makes a determination of the beneficiary's financial hardship, such
forgiveness was to be an exception used only occasionally. 1 6 6 As recently
as August 2002, the OIG was still sending much the same message. 167 In a
Special Advisory Bulletin, the OIG warned against "Offering Gifts and
Other Inducements to Beneficiaries." 168 Therein, the OIG declared the
same general rule that giving free services typically violates Medicare
rules. 16 9 Further, the OIG announced that anti-kickback exposure existed
when a provider gave free services to Medicare beneficiaries based on a
broad category of financial need as opposed to a case-by-case finding of
170
indigence.
165. See OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,375 (Dec. 19,
1994). While Medicare Part B generally refers to physician services, the OIG noted
that the Fraud Alert was not intended to legitimize Part A (hospital) waivers:
This fraud alert is not intended to address the routine waiver of copayments and deductibles by providers, practitioners or suppliers who are
paid on the basis of costs or diagnostic related groups. [Inpatient hospital services are generally reimbursed by Medicare under a diagnostic related group (DRG) methodology.] The fact that these types of services
are not discussed in this fraud alert should not be interpreted to legitimize routine waiver of deductibles and copayments with respect to these
payment methods.
Id. at 65,374 (noting that fraud alert is not intended to address hospital waivers).
In fact, Advisory Opinions issued by the OIG have indicated that the OIG is concerned about hospitals' routine waivers of cost sharing for program beneficiaries.
See, e.g., 01-7 Op. DHHS-OIG (2001) (addressing OIG concern about routine fee
waivers by hospitals).
166. See OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. at 65,375 ("This hardship exception, however, must not be used routinely; it should be used occasionally to
address the special financial needs of a particular patient ....
Except in such special cases, a good faith effort to collect deductibles and copayments must be
made.").
167. OFFCE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTh AND HUMAN SERVICES,
SPECIAL ADvIsORY BULL.,

OFFERING

GIFTS AND OTHER INDUCEMENTS

TO BENEFI-

5 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/
SABGiftsandlnducements.pdf (stating limits on waivers of fees for financial need).
168. Id. at 1.
169. See id. at 2 (stating that "unless a provider's practices fit within an exception (as implemented by regulations) or are the subject of a favorable advisory
opinion covering a provider's own activity, any gifts or free services to [Medicare or
Medicaid] beneficiaries should not exceed the $10 per item and $50 annual
limits").
170. See id. at 5. The OIG stated that:
[T] here is no meaningful statutory basis for a broad exemption based on
the financial need of a category of patients. The statute specifically applies the prohibition to the Medicaid program-a program that is available only to financially needy persons. The inclusion of Medicaid within
the prohibition demonstrates Congress' conclusion that categorical financial need is not a sufficient basis for permitting valuable gifts. This
conclusion is supported by the statute's specific exception for non-routine waivers of copayments and deductibles based on individual financial
need. If Congress intended a broad exception for financially needy perCIARIEs
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A number of Advisory Opinions issued by the OIG confirm that waivers of coinsurance or deductibles for Medicare beneficiaries can be problematic unless based upon a documented individualized determination of
need. 17 1 Although the OIG has issued a number of Advisory Opinions
declining to impose sanctions for free services or waiving cost sharing
amounts to Medicare beneficiaries, the OIG has made it clear that these
cases are unique. For example, waivers have been approved where they
were offered to encourage patients to obtain preventive services that they
might not otherwise opt to receive, 172 to encourage patients to participate
in clinical trials that could lead to important scientific findings 17 3 and to
174
fulfill a provider's nationally recognized charitable mission.
sons, it is unlikely that it would have expressly included the Medicaid program within the prohibition and then created such a narrow exception.
Id.
171. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 02-7, slip op. at 1 (June 12, 2002),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2002/aoO207.pdf (stating that
waiver of coinsurance for portable x-ray services provided to nursing home residents could violate anti-kickback statute and be grounds for sanctions under Social Security Act as waivers were not based on financial need, but on administrative
burdens sought to be avoided by nursing homes); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 974, slip op. at I (Sept. 25, 1997), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/
1997/97_4.pdf (advising ambulatory surgical center that declining to pursue collection of copayments from patients with employer-sponsored Medicare supplemental coverage may constitute grounds for sanctions under fraud provisions of
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, anti-kickback statute and Social Security Act, as waivers were not based on individualized determination of
financial need and were intended to induce beneficiaries to obtain services at ambulatory surgery center).
172. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 01-14, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 4, 2001),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/aoO-1 4.pdf (stating that
no sanctions would be imposed regarding hospital's waiver of copayments and deductibles for screening services to promote early detection of breast and gynecological cancers).
173. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 04-01, slip op. at 2 (Feb. 9, 2004),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2004/aoO401G.pdf (stating that
waiver of cost sharing amounts for blood glucose equipment and supplies used by
Medicare beneficiaries participating in diabetes investigation clinical trial would
not constitute grounds for imposition of sanctions); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No.
02-16, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 3, 2003), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2002/ao0216a.pdf (finding that waiver of cost sharing amounts for blood
glucose equipment and supplies used by Medicare beneficiaries participating in
clinical trial for cardiovascular risks would not constitute grounds for imposition of
sanctions); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 00-5, slip. op. at 2 (July 7, 2000), http://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2000/ao00_5.htm (finding that waiver
of cost sharing amounts to participants in clinical study of emphysema would not
result in sanctions); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 98-6, slip op. at 2 (May 1, 1998),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/1998/ao986.pdf (finding that
waiving coinsurance amounts for participants in clinical trial for emphysema treatment would not result in sanctions).
174. See, e.g., Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 01-7, slip op. at 6 (July 3, 2001),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/aoOl-07.pdf (stating that
tuberculosis sanatorium's application of "Insurance Only Billing Policy" is "singular vestige of Hospital['s] charitable origin and continuing mission"); Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 99-7, slip op. at 2 (July 9, 1999), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss1/11

26

2006]

Cohen: The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured - No Villa
CONTROVERSY OVER HosPITAL CHARGES

Statements made by CMS and the OIG at the congressional hearing
further confirm that routine waivers for Medicare beneficiaries are prohibited. When asked by the Subcommittee whether setting an indigence
threshold at a given percentage of the federal poverty level 175 would violate the Medicare rules, 176 CMS responded that there could be a problem
177
if the level selected amounted to a waiver of coinsurance in every case.
When asked to confirm that a hospital's posting of its charity care policy
on its web site or including its charity care policy on its bills would not
violate Medicare rules, once again, the 0IG declined to give a clear "yes"
answer. The OIG responded that "one of the elements [of meeting the
anti-kickback safe harbor] is not advertising the promotion of those rou1 78
tine waivers."
Even when hospitals presumably seek to fulfill Medicare's requirements for individualized assessments of need and reasonable collection
efforts prior to waiving cost sharing or forgiving debt for Medicare beneficiaries, Medicare audits show that Medicare often challenges hospitals'
claims for bad debt reimbursement on the grounds that the indigence
findings were not sufficiently documented 179 or that the collection efforts
advisoryopinions/1999/ao99_7.htm (stating that National Eye Care Project's
waiver of copayments is "key component" of medical services covered by project);
Op. Off. Inspector Gen. No. 99-6, slip op. at 2 (Apr. 14,1999), http://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/1999/ao99_6.htm (finding that St. Jude Children's
Research Hospital's policy of not billing pediatric oncology patients for coinsurance and deductibles would not be subject to sanctions).
175. See Lagnado, Full Price,supra note 33 (stating that federal poverty level in
2004 was $8980 year for individual and $18,400 for family of four).
176. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 147 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood,
Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations) (asking CMS whether setting charity care policy that triggered at 500, 700 or 800% of federal poverty level would trigger regulatory
concern).

177. See id. (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center for Medicare Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services) (stating that setting income level too high to consistently
waive deductible would be problem).
178. See id. at 146 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). The OIG stated
that public service announcements and fliers would be permissible, but that "people should not be encouraged to seek medical care where they are told there is no
out-of-pocket, and it is being put on the side of buses." Id.
179. See, e.g., OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, AUDIT OF INPATIENT BAD DEBTS CLAIMED BY MEMORIAL HERMANN HospiTAL IN ITS MEDICARE COST REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2000, Au-

DIT No. A-06-02-0027, at 4-7 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/
region6/60200027.pdf (concluding that hospital did not meet reimbursement requirements for certain claims due to failure to document indigence findings); OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REVIEW OF
MEDICARE DEBTS FORJACKSON MEMORIAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,

1999, AUDIT No. A-04-02-02015, at 4-9 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/
reports/region4/40202015.pdf (same); see also Hoag Mem'l Hosp. Presbyterian v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n/United Gov't Servs., LLC, No. 2002-D28, 2002
WL 31548714, at *3 (P.R.R.B. Aug. 2, 2002) (denying reimbursement for certain
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were not sufficiently rigorous.180 Moreover, the audits illustrate that when
hospitals' claims for bad debt reimbursement are challenged by Medicare,
substantial reimbursement amounts may be withheld1 8 1 for a significant
period of time pending appeal. 182 Therefore, these audits justifiably reinbad debts due in part to hospital's failure to provide evidence of determination of
indigent status); Peachtree Rehab. Ctr. v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 99-D9, 1998
WL 870204, at *7 (P.R.R.B. Nov. 24, 1998) (same).
Recently, in announcing Compliance Program Guidance for hospitals, the
OIG confirmed that the documentation required for claiming reimbursement for
Medicare bad debt is substantial:
A hospital should examine a patient's total resources, which could include, but are not limited to, an analysis of assets, liabilities, income, expenses, and any extenuating circumstances that would affect the
determination. The hospital should document the method by which it
determined the indigency and include all backup information used to
substantiate the determination. If, instead of making such a determina-

tion, a hospital attempts to collect the outstanding amounts from the
Medicare beneficiary, such efforts must be documented in the patient's
file with copies of the bill(s), follow-up letters, and reports of telephone
and personal contacts. In the case of a dually-eligible patient (i.e., a patient entitled to both Medicare and Medicaid), the hospital should document the bad debt claim by including a denial of payment from the State.
Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858 (Jan. 31, 2005).
In guidance issued on February 2, 2004, the OIG further stated that hospitals
"should recheck a patient's eligibility at reasonable intervals sufficient to ensure
that the patient remains in financial need." See OFFcE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, BULL., HOSPITAL DISCOUNTS OFFERED TO
PATIENTS WHO CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY THEIR

HOSPITAL

BILLS

4 (2004) [hereinafter

available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2004/FA021904hospitaldiscounts.pdf.
180. See, e.g., Metro Physical Therapy & Rehab., Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Ass'n/United Gov't Servs., LLC, No. 2002-D35, 2002 WL 31005907, at *4
(P.R.R.B. Aug. 28, 2002) (finding that provider sent working patients' accounts to
collection agency, but that non-working patients' accounts, presumed to be mostly
Medicare, were written off as bad debt without being sent to collection agency);
OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REVIEW OF
MEDICARE DEBTS FOR FLORIDA HOSPITAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1999, AUDIT No. A-04-02-02011, at 4-6 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/
reports/region4/40202011.pdf (finding that hospital used more collection efforts
for its non-Medicare patients than it did for Medicare patients); see also AHA, FEDOFFERED DISCOUNTS],

ERAL REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS' EFFORTS TO ASSIST PATIENTS OF LIMITED
MEANS 2-3 (2003)
[hereinafter REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS], available at

http://www.caringforcommunities.org/caringforcommunities/content/031217
fedregs.pdf (stating that OIG reviews and audits have "created an expectation that
hospitals must be aggressive in their collection efforts or risk losing Medicare reimbursement for bad debt").

181. See, e.g., OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, AUDIT OF INPATIENT BAD DEBTS CLAIMED BY MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSPITAL IN ITS MEDICARE COST REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2000, AUDIT

No. A-06-02-0027, at 7 (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region6/60200027.pdf (reviewing finding by OIG that hospital's bad debt claim was
overstated by $919,331).
182. See, e.g., Hoag Mem'l Hosp. Presbyterian, 2002 WL 31548714, at *3 (noting
review decision issued August 2, 2002 relating to period ending September 11,
1993); Peachtree Rehab. Ctr., 1998 WL 870204, at *7 (noting review decision issued
November 24, 1998 relating to period ending December 31, 1991).
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forced hospitals' perceptions that the safest route from a Medicare reimbursement perspective was to reduce charges or forgive debt for Medicare
beneficiaries only in rare instances or not at all, and to undertake vigorous
1 83
collection activities for all Medicare patients.
The hospitals' argument that Medicare rules and fraud and abuse
laws prohibited them from discounting charges to the uninsured is considerably weaker than its defenses with regard to Medicare beneficiaries, as
there are no direct statutory or regulatory prohibitions on waiver for uninsured patients. The Medicare billing rules and federal anti-kickback law
do not apply directly to this class of patients because they are not covered
84
by Medicare or any other federal healthcare program.1
Nevertheless, there were still some bases for hospitals to have been
legitimately concerned over discounting charges to the uninsured. The
hospitals' best defense is Medicare's "uniform charge rule," which requires
hospitals to set uniform charges for all patients 185 to ensure that costs of
treating non-Medicare patients are not being shifted to the Medicare program. 18 6 As the OIG noted at the congressional hearing, it is authorized
to exclude from Medicare participation any provider that charges Medicare more than it charges other patients for the same service. 1 87 The AHA
183. See REGuLATIONS HAMPER HosPrrALs, supra note 180, at 10-11 (explaining
that Medicare audit procedures further pushed hospitals to bill uninsured patients
in full and aggressively collect debts owed). The AHA asserted:
The length and the complexity of the appeals process for disallowed payments further deter hospitals from curtailing collection efforts from low[In one instance], [t]he hospital had to fight the
income patients ....
issue administratively and in federal court for more than 10 years to receive definitive guidance on the question from a federal appeals court.
Thus, when the Medicare policies on bad debts are unclear, it takes years
to settle the disputes, at substantial cost and with substantial sums of
Medicare reimbursement at stake .... The effect of the entire regulatory
scheme is to pressure hospitals in these circumstances to be conservative
in following the standard collection agency course, rather than negotiate
a lower payment amount.
Id.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1) (2000) (restricting applicability of antikickback law to payments made under "federal healthcare program"). Obviously,
the Medicare billing rules are applicable only to Medicare members.
185. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS, supra note 180, at 4 (examining
Section 2203 of the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, which states, in
relevant part, that "[s] o that its charges may be allowable for use in apportioning
costs under the program, each facility should have an established charge structure
which is applied uniformly to each patient as services are furnished to the patient").
186. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) ("In order to
prevent fraud and abuse, the Medicare program required hospitals to establish a
uniform set of charges that would apply to everyone .... Otherwise the hospitals
could allocate charges in such a way that would result in more costs to the Medicare program.").
187. See id. at 137 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("The antikickback
statute and permissive exclusion authority [prohibit] suppliers from charging
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stated that this was a justifiable basis for hospitals to resist discounting
18 8
charges to the uninsured.
The OIG attempted to dispel the hospitals' concern over the uniform
charge rule, however, by pointing out that it has proposed regulations
clarifying that reduced charges offered to uninsured patients will not be
considered as the hospital's usual charges for purposes of the OIG's exclusionary authority.1 8 9 Nevertheless, as the OIG itself conceded, these regulations are still in proposed form, not finalized. 190 Moreover, this
declared change in Medicare reimbursement policy is relatively recent,
having appeared in the Federal Register on September 15, 2003.191
Medicare and Medicaid substantially more than they usually charge other customers."). The OIG is statutorily authorized to exclude from participation in Medicare
and Medicaid any individual who: "has submitted or caused to be submitted bills
or requests for payment [under Medicare] or a State health care program ...
containing charges . . .for items or services furnished substantially in excess of
such individual's or entity's usual charges ...." See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (6) (A)
(2000) (stating grounds for exclusion). The implementing regulations restate that
the OIG may exclude an individual or entity that has "[s]ubmitted, or caused to be
submitted, bills or requests for payments under Medicare or any of the State health
care programs containing charges or costs for items or services furnished that are
substantially in excess of such individual's or entity's usual charges or costs for
such items or services . . . ." See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.701(a)(1) (2004) (authorizing
exclusion of individuals from Medicare and Medicaid where reimbursement requests exceed usual charges). The OIG explained at the congressional hearing
that "[t] his law is intended to protect the Medicare and Medicaid programs-and
the taxpayers-from providers and suppliers that routinely charge the Medicare or
Medicaid programs substantially more than they usually charge other customers."
See Hearing,supra note 1, at 137 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office
of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
188. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITAIS, supra note 180, at 4 ("The practical
result of CMS's insistence on uniform charges is that hospitals have been discouraged from lowering their charges to patients of limited means."); see also PRYOR,
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 79, at 6 (reporting that Medicare carriers
manual states that routinely waiving fees constitutes reduction in provider's usual
and customary charges, so that Medicare may reduce reimbursement for Medicare
patients by amount of waived fees). When questioned at an Open Door Forum on
June 1, 2004, whether the indigency criteria for Medicare patients must be applied
to non-Medicare patients, CMS staffers provided very little clarification, responding that "differences in the criteria for Medicare and non-Medicare patients would
be permitted so long as the threshold requirements are 'similar.'" See AHA,CMS/
OIG OPEN DOOR FORUM ON HOSPITAL BILLING AND COLLECTIONS, A SUMMARY 1
(2004), available at http://www.caringforcommunities.org/caringforcommunities/
content/040601 opendoor.pdf.
189. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 137 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
(stating that OIG proposed regulations "clarify that free or substantially reduced
prices offered to uninsured do not need to be factored into a hospital's usual
charges for purposes of the exclusion authority").
190. See id.
191. See Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting
Claims Containing Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939, 53,941 (proposed Sept.
15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (noting proposed rule to amend
OIG exclusionary authority). The OIG confirmed by guidance issued in February
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Further, despite the OIG's efforts to ameliorate concerns over the
uniform charge rule, the OIG has never stated that a hospital's "usual
charges" can be amounts that, in fact, are never billed to any patients or
perhaps only to a few patients. 1 92 This leaves open the question of how
extensively hospitals can waive and discount their charges to the uninsured while still maintaining that they have master charges against which
their Medicare rates can be measured for purposes of compliance with the
uniform charge rule.
In addition, CMS and the OIG failed to address the hospitals' legitimate dilemma regarding how discounting charges to the uninsured might
impact the hospitals' use of charges as the benchmark for negotiating
third-party rates. As stated at the congressional hearing by the CEO of the
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA):
The more complicated problem is that many of our contractsand at HCA we have over 5,000 contracts with managed care
providers across the country. Many of those contracts are not on
a per diem basis or case rate basis, but are really based on a discount off of charges.... It will take us probably two to two and a
half years to renegotiate all of those contracts because many of
193
them are multiple year contracts.
As a result, any lowering of charges to benefit the uninsured could have
unintended and drastic consequences to the reimbursements collected by
the hospitals under their third-party contracts. 19 4 While rates with thirdparty payors could be renegotiated to address this contingency in the future, multi-year term third-party contracts might presently bar hospitals
19 5
from tampering with their charge schedules.
2004 that it would not consider free or reduced charges to uninsured or underinsured patients when calculating usual charges for purposes of its exclusionary authority. See OFFERED DiscouNTs, supra note 179, at 1 (presenting decision not to
consider free or reduced charges to uninsured or underinsured persons when calculating Medicare reimbursement).
192. Even if a hospital discounted charges for all uninsured patients, it could
still bill full charges to non-indigent international visitors who come to the United
States for healthcare. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management)
(stating that these international visitors are "typically affluent individuals who need
a procedure that can be performed most effectively in the United States").
193. Id. at 114 (statement of Jack 0. Bovender, Jr., Chairman and CEO, the
Hospital Corporation of America).
194. See Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (providing that "[t]he elaborate
pricing systems hospitals have developed over the years will be difficult to
change"). The article further stated: "'The entire system will have to be blown up
[if charges are discounted for the uninsured].'" Id. (quotingJan Emerson, spokeswoman for California Healthcare Association).
195. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 114 (statement of Jack 0. Bovender, Jr.,
Chairman and CEO, the Hospital Corporation of America) ("It will take us probably two to two and a half years to renegotiate all of those [managed care] contracts
because many of them are multiple year contracts."); see also PRYOR, UNINTENDED
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Hospitals also legitimately argued that the "uniform collections rule"
served as an impediment to across-the-board free or discounted care for
the uninsured. The uniform collections rule requires providers to use
similar efforts to collect debts from Medicare beneficiaries as from nonMedicare patients. 196 CMS and the OIG confirmed at the congressional
hearing that "[i]f a hospital wants Medicare bad debt reimbursement, it
must at the very least send non-indigent Medicare patients a bill for the
debt, and must make some reasonable effort to collect from Medicare patients as it does from non-Medicarepatients."197 CMS has made similar statements in opinion letters.' 98 These statements justifiably signaled to the
hospitals that they must undertake the same vigorous collections efforts
for all patients, including the uninsured, or risk losing Medicare bad debt
reimbursement. 199
Finally, there are still some explicit link-ups between hospitals' uninsured billing practices and Medicare billing rules. CMS conceded at the
congressional hearing that for at least a limited group of providers subject
supra note 79, at 10 ("Many managed care contracts also stipulate
that the provider must charge the 'usual' fee for services rendered to members.").
196. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HosprTms, supra note 180, at 4 (discussing
Medicare collections requirement). The uniform collections rule has been recognized by the federal courts. See Mt. Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 196 F.3d 703,
706 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Section 310 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual provides
that: 'To be considered a reasonable collection effort, a provider's effort to collect
Medicare deductible and coinsurance amounts must be similar to the effort provider puts forth to collect comparable amounts from non-Medicare patients.'").
197. Hearing,supra note 1, at 145 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director, Center
for Medicare Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (emphasis added). A CMS representative also stated at the congressional hearing that "if the hospital wants to bill the
Medicare program for bad debt related to unpaid deductibles and co-insurance by
Medicare beneficiaries, it must use the same level of collection activity to secure
collection of those debts by Medicare patients as it does to secure collection of
debts by non-Medicare patients." See id. at 131-32 (providing that "[e]fforts to collect from non-Medicare patients must be similar to the efforts to collect from
Medicare patients").
198. See, e.g., REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS, supra note 180, at 8 (suggesting that "[w] here a provider expends less effort to collect from some patients
than from others. . . it has an inconsistent collection effort contrary to Medicare
policy" (quoting Letter from Laurence D. Wilson, Director Chronic Care Policy
Group, CMS, to Mark Rukavina (Sept. 11, 2003) (on file with author))).
199. The hospitals' argument that the uniform collections rule compelled
collections of uninsured debt is not completely logical, however. Presumably, the
rule was adopted by Medicare to preserve Medicare funds, by preventing hospitals
from collecting bad debt reimbursement from the program without first making
the same reasonable collections efforts for Medicare patients that the hospitals
used for non-Medicare patients. Here, however, the issue was whether the hospitals could forego collections from uninsured patients, resulting in their using more
stringent, not more lax, debt collection practices for Medicare beneficiaries. Forgiving debt for the uninsured would not cause hospitals to abandon reasonable
collections for Medicare members, so that doing so, at least in principle, would not
appear to offend the uniform collections rule.
CONSEQUENCES,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss1/11

32

Cohen: The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured - No Villa
2006]

CONTROVERSY OVER HOSPITAL CHARGES

to the "lesser of cost-or-charges" reimbursement principle 2 °0 (whereby
Medicare reimbursement is based upon the lesser of the provider's cost or
charge level) 20 1 reducing charges, even if just for the uninsured, could
decrease the hospital's reimbursement from Medicare. 20 2 In new guidance issued in February 2004, the OIG noted that charges reported for
purposes of setting a hospital's cost-to-charge ratio are still "used to set
reimbursement in certain areas of the Medicare program, such as some
features of the outpatient prospective payment system." 20 3 And as noted
by the AHA, Medicare's entire conversion to a case based system has been
relatively recent, with the program's discontinuance of cost-based outpatient payments having occurred only three years prior to the congressional
hearing. 20 4 Accordingly, hospitals' rate structures and discounting policies understandably may still reflect older charge-based methods of determining reimbursement.

VIII.

INITIAL RULINGS ON THE FEDERAL CLAIMS IN THE

CHARITY CARE CLASS ACTIONS

The early decisions rendered by the district courts in the class actions
challenging hospitals' billing and collections practices have been almost
unanimously in favor of the hospitals. First, a serious early blow to the
class action plaintiffs occurred when the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

200. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 134 (statement of Herb Kuhn, Director,
Center for Medicare Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("Few providers are subject to
the [lesser of cost or charges] principle at all .... The only example I am aware of
is a pediatric or cancer hospital in its first year of operation ....
").
201. See id. at 133 (providing that "where the LCC [lesser of cost or charges]
principle is applicable, a Medicare provider is paid the lesser of its actual costs or its
actual charges").
202. See id. (noting hospitals' potential loss of Medicare reimbursement after
reducing charges to uninsured). Kuhn continues:
Implementing a reduced charge program for uninsured patients could
potentially trigger the LCC [lesser of cost or charges] principle because if
a hospital lowered charges for enough patients, a hospital's fiscal intermediary could take the position that a hospital's charges were not its
posted, or stated, charges, but rather, the charges applicable to most of its
patients who were receiving discounted services. If the FI [fiscal intermediary] did take that position, it could then invoke the LCC principle and
pay the hospital that lower charge-based amount.
Id.
203. See Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, Questions on Charges for the Uninsured, http://www.cms.gov/
FAQUninsured.pdf (last visitedJan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Questions on Charges
for the Uninsured] (stating that hospitals must continue to report charges on annual cost reports for certain reimbursements under Medicare).
204. See REGULATIONS HAMPER HOSPITALS, supra note 180, at 6-7.
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Litigation refused to centralize 20 5 the federal class actions. 20 6 The theory
supporting centralization was that the lawsuits all challenged the same
types of billing and collections practices by the hospitals. 20 7 The panel
denied centralization, however, ruling that it would neither serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses nor further the just and efficient
conduct of the litigation. The court held that "[n]otwithstanding the
numerosity of actions, movants have failed to persuade us that these actions share sufficient common questions of fact to warrant § 1407 transfer." 20 8 This was a substantial defeat for the plaintiffs because they lost the
economies of time and cost, as well as the sheer leverage, of handling the
pre-trial motions of all the federal cases in one forum.
The centralization denial was followed by a growing number of dismissals of the federal claims by the various district courts that had occasion
to rule. 20 9 These courts virtually unanimously dismissed with prejudice
205. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000) (permitting "civil actions involving one or
more common questions of fact ... pending in different districts (to be] transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings").
206. See In re Not-For-Profit Hospitals/Uninsured Patients Litig., 341 F. Supp.

2d 1354, 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (denying centralization of actions).
207. See MultidistrictJudicialPanel Re'ects Motion to Consolidate, Transfer Charity

Care Cases, supra note 119 (observing that lawsuits "share a common theme").
208. See In re Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2004)
(denying centralization).
209. See Grant v. Trinity Health-Mich., 390 F. Supp. 2d 643, 658 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (dismissing federal claims); Hutt v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., No. 04-03440,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21548, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2005) (same); Feliciano v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., No. 04-CV-04177, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21565, at
*21 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2005) (same); McCoy v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare
Sys., No. 2:04-CV-223, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19416, at *29-30 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31,
2005) (same); Nash v. Lee Mem'l Health Sys., No. 204CV369FTM29DNF, 2005 WL
2043642, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2005) (same); Kabeller v. Orlando Reg'] Healthcare Sys., No. 6:04-cv-1106-Orl-19DAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20219, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 11, 2005) (same); Cygan v. Resurrection Med. Ctr., No. 04 C 4168, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19867, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2005) (same); Gardner v. N. Miss.
Health Servs., No. 1:04cv235, 2005 WL 1312753, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2005)
(same); Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (same); Ellis v.
Phoebe Putney Health Sys., No. l:04-CV-80(WLS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19935, at
*15 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2005) (same); Corley v. John D. Archibald Mem'l Hosp.,
Inc., No. 1:04-CV-110 (WLS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8057, at *20 (M.D. Ga. Mar.
31, 2005) (same); Watts v. Advocate Health Care Network, No. 04 C 4062, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7418, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2005) (same); Valencia v. Miss.
Baptist Med. Ctr. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873-76 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (same); Fields
v. Banner Health, No. CIV-04-1297-PHX-SRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13481, at *2223 (D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2005) (same);Jellison v. Fla. Hosp. Healthcare Sys., Inc., No.
6:04-cv-1021-Orl-28KRS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *26 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14,
2005) (same); Quinn v. BJC Health Sys., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1057 (E.D. Mo.
2005) (same); Wright v. St. Dominic Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:04CV521LN, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8086, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2005) (same); Schmitt v. Protestant
Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 04-CV-00577-DRH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7449, at *28
(S.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2005) (same); Sabeta v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., No. 0421437-CIV-JORDAN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *59 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2005)
(same); Hagedorn v. St. Thomas Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04-0526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7259, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2005) (same); Peterson v. Fairview Health Servs.,
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the federal tax, FDCPA, EMTALA and § 1983 claims, and declined jurisdiction over the state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice to re2 10
plead in a state forum.
Fatal to plaintiffs' federal tax claims was the district courts' uniform
rulings that the grant of a § 501 (c) (3) charitable tax exemption does not
2 11
create a contract between the recipient and the federal government.
The courts indicated that such a holding was compelled by a historic line
of cases unequivocally rejecting the notion of such a contract: "The notion
that the Federal Income Tax is contractual or otherwise consensual in nature is . . . utterly without foundation, .

.

. [and] has been repeatedly re-

jected by the courts." 2 12 Based on this finding, the courts ruled that the
grant of a federal charitable tax exemption could not give rise to a claim
for breach of contract or breach of an implied contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 2 13 The district courts further held that even assuming, arguendo, a contract existed, § 501 (c) (3) does not give rise to a private
Nos. 04-2973 ADM/AJB, 04-2974 ADM/AJB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962, at *10
(D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2005) (same); Daly v. Baptist Health, No. 4:04CV789GH, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6270, at *14 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 31, 2005) (same); Washington v. Med.
Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-185 (CAR), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *26
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (same); Shriner v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No.
3:04CV7435, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 894, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2005) (same);
Hudson v. Cent. Ga. Health Servs., No. 5:04CV301 (DF), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2613, at *28 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2005) (same); Lorens v. Catholic Health Care Partners, 356 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (same); Ferguson v. Centura
Health Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 (D. Colo. 2004) (same); Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 501 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (dismissing all
federal claims except for Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act);
Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1085 (S.D. Ala. 2004);
Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C 04-02624 WHA, 2004 WL 2873068, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 30, 2004) (same); see also Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d
707, 713-24 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (dismissing federal claims under Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act and state law claims).
210. For a further discussion of the federal tax, FDCPA, EMTALA and § 1983
claims asserted by the class action plaintiffs, see infra notes 211-30 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Gardner v. N. Miss. Health Servs., No. 1:04cv235, 2005 WL
1312753, at *3 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2005) (finding no privately enforceable contractual duty under § 501 (c) (3)); Lorens, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (declaring that
"(n]o court has ever held that 501 (c) (3) creates a binding contract"); see also Valencia, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 873-75 (finding no contract created by granting tax exempt
status under § 501 (c) (3)); Jellison, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *6-10 (same);
Wright, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8086, at *3 (same); Schmitt, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7449, at *19 (same); Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *15 (same); Hagedorn,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7259, at *7 (same); Peterson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962, at
*4 (same); Daly, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6270, at *12 (same); Washington, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *6 (same); Shriner,2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 894, at *3 (same);
Hudson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2613, at *10 (same); Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 105152; Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (same); Burton, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94 (same).
212. Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (quoting from McLaughlin v. Comm'r, 832
F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987)).
213. See, e.g., id. at 755-56 (ruling against plaintiffs' contract claims).
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right of action 21 4 and that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert such a
claim. 2 15 In addition, the courts ruled that § 501(c) (3) does not contain
language demonstrating intent to create a trust, so that there was no basis
to claim breach of a charitable trust. 2 16 To the extent that unjust enrichment or constructive trust claims were premised upon the existence of a
contract under § 501 (c) (3), the district courts dismissed those counts as
well. 2 17 Finally, the district courts dismissed the conspiracy and aiding
and abetting claims against the AHA to the extent that the claims were
based on the faulty federal breach of contract and breach of trust
2 18
claims.
214. See, e.g., id. at 756 (finding no private right of action under § 501 (c) (3)).
215. See, e.g.,Jellison, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *10-11 (ruling that there
is no language in § 501 (c) (3) demonstrating that plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of hospital's tax exempt status).
216. See, e.g., Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (finding IRS revenue rulings did
not evince creation of charitable trust under § 501 (c) (3)).
217. See, e.g.,
Quinn v. BJC Health Sys., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054-55 (E.D.
Mo. 2005) (dismissing count for unjust enrichment and constructive trust); see also
Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1082-83 (S.D. Ala. 2004) (dismissing plaintiffs' unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims, inter alia, on
basis of resjudicata,holding that claims were compulsory counterclaims which were
required to be raised in state court collections actions, and that failure to raise
claims in that forum barred plaintiffs' ability to raise them in later action).
218. See, e.g.,
Lorens v. Catholic Health Care Partners, 356 F. Supp. 2d 827,
835 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (dismissing claims for aiding and abetting breach of contract because no contract existed under § 501 (c) (3)). Even if the courts had
found the existence of a contract between the hospitals and the federal government, a private right of action and standing, it still remains questionable whether,
under current revenue rulings, the contracts were breached by the hospitals' manner of implementing charity care. In 1956, the IRS ruled that "[t]he fact that [a
hospital's] charity record is relatively low is not conclusive that a hospital is not
operated for charitable purposes .... ." See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. The
IRS declared that the only requirement was that the hospital must not turn away
patients due to their inability to pay. See id. (remarking that hospitals cannot refuse to accept patients who cannot pay for services). In 1969, the IRS ruled that a
hospital that limits admissions only to those who can pay for their care and generally does not provide emergency services still can be tax exempt, insofar as it furthers the charitable purpose of "providing hospital care on a nonprofit basis for
members of its community .. " SeeRev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (noting that
free services are not sole basis for charitable exemption); see also Rev. Rul. 83-157,
1983-2 C.B. 94 (ruling that hospital that limits admissions to patients able to pay
for their care, including Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, and does not operate emergency room, nevertheless operates exclusively to benefit community and
is thus entitled to tax exempt status).
In 2001, the IRS heightened the test by declaring that the charity care requirement of the community benefit standard requires a hospital to demonstrate that it
delivers "significant health care services to the indigent." See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.
Mem. 200110030, 2001 WL 234018, at *4 (Feb. 5, 2001) (strengthening charity
care requirements). The IRS further declared that "[t ] he provision of free or subsidized care to the indigent is a significant indicator to the courts and the Service
that a hospital promotes health for the benefit of the community." See id.at *6.
Nevertheless, the Advice Memo falls short of stating an amount or form of charity
care that a hospital must provide to retain its tax exemption, and states that satisfaction of the community benefit standard "is based on all the facts and circum-
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The district courts dismissed the FDCPA claims because the statute
applies only to "debt collectors," 2 19 and the hospitals did not qualify as
debt collectors under the statutory definition. 22 0 Indeed, in at least one
case, plaintiffs conceded at the hearing on the dismissal motion that the
22 1
hospital defendant was not governed by the FDCPA.
Next, the district courts dismissed virtually all of the EMTAIA
claims. 222 The gist of plaintiffs' allegations was that the hospitals had required them to sign a guarantee of payment before rendering emergency
stances." See id. at *7 (explaining that whether hospital operates for charitable
purposes is inevitably case-by-case determination). Therefore, the standard currently does not require hospitals to offer a given amount or type of charity care.
219. The statute defines a "debt collector" as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to
collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000). The term also "includes any creditor who,
in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which
would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such
debts." Id.
220. See, e.g., Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C 04-02624 WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24592, at *14-16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2004) (holding that "[c]reditors who
collect in their own name and whose principal business is not debt collection,
therefore, are not subject to the Act" (quoting Aubert v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 137
F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998))); see also Washington v. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc.,
No. 5:04-cv-1 85, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *24 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (opining that organization's principal purpose of business must be collection of debts to
fall under purview of statute); Hogland v. Athens Reg'l Health Servs., Inc., No.
3:04-cv-50, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7763, at *27 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (same);
Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 498 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(same). But see, e.g., Sabeta v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., No. 04-21437-CIV-JORDAN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *50 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2005) (declining to
dismiss FDCPA claim to allow plaintiffs discovery to determine accuracy of hospital's defense that it is not debt collector); Carlson v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
378 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to dismiss FDCPA claim
based upon allegations that hospital attempted collection using another name [Regional Claims Recovery Service], which under statute allows hospital to be deemed
debt collector and therefore subject to Act).
221. See Darr,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24592, at *14 (acknowledging that defendant is neither creditor nor debt collector and thus not governed by FDCPA).
222. See, e.g., Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713-16
(E.D. Mich. 2005) (finding plaintiffs failed to state EMTALA claim); Gardner v. N.
Miss. Health Servs., No. 1:04cv235, 2005 WL 1312753, at *5-6 (N.D. Miss. May 31,
2005) (holding that plaintiffs failed to allege personal harm to support claim
under EMTALA);Jellison v. Fla. Hosp. Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1021-Orl28KRS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036, at *13-15 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2005) (same);
Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1049-50 (stating that reasonable registration process that
does not delay screening or treatment is not violative of EMTALA); Wright v. St.
Dominic Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:04CV521LN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8086, at *4
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2005) (same); Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *32-36
(same); Peterson v. Fairview Health Servs., Nos. 04-2973 ADM/AJB, 04-2974 ADM/
AJB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962, at *25-28 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2005) (same); Hogland, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7763, at *22-25 (same); Washington, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2614, at *18-22 (same); Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 (W.D. Pa.
2004) (same); Kizzire, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 1084-85 (same).
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treatment. 223 The district courts ruled that EMTALA does not forbid such
inquiries into ability to pay, "so long as [the hospital's] inquiry does not
delay screening or treatment." 224 Because the EMTALA claimants had received prompt emergency treatment despite the hospitals' inquiries regarding source of payment, there was no basis to assert a violation of
EMTALA.2 25 In addition, the federal courts ruled that EMTALA claimants must suffer "personal harm" due to the hospital's delay or refusal to
render emergency treatment. 2 26 Here the EMTALA claimants asserted
that they had suffered "economic injury" only, rendering their EMTALA
22 7
claims deficient.
223. See, e.g., Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (stating plaintiffs' allegation that
"before UPMC provided them emergency medical screening or treatment, it first
determined their ability to pay for such care and required them to sign form contracts agreeing to pay UPMC in full for their care").
224. See, e.g., id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d) (4) (iv) (2005)) (permitting
hospitals to conduct "reasonable registration processes" for emergency patients).
The court stated:
Hospitals may follow reasonable registration processes for individuals for
whom examination or treatment is required by this section, including asking whether an individual is insured and, if so, what that insurance is, so
long as that inquiry does not delay screening or treatment.
Id.
225. See, e.g., id. (explaining that EMTALA claim fails because no allegation
that hospital delayed screening or treating plaintiffs); see also PRYOR, UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES, supranote 79, at 1 ("EMTALA only requires that hospitals provide
acute care, and it does not require that they provide the care for free or at a
discount.").
226. See, e.g., Amato, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (2)
(A) (2005)) (allowing both damages for injury and equitable relief for those injured by delayed screening or treatment). The statute provides:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil
action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available
for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is
located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
227. See id. at 758-59 (ruling EMTALA claim deficient because plaintiffs alleged economic injury only); see also Ferguson v. Centura Health Corp., 358 F.
Supp. 2d 1014, 1020 (D. Colo. 2004) (declining to rule on EMTALA claim as hospital defendants had not moved to dismiss that claim, but noting that plaintiffs had
failed to allege personal harm). Several district courts stated additional grounds
for dismissal of the EMTALA claims. See, e.g., Jellison, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8036,
at *15 (dismissing EMTALA claim as time barred); Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6132, at *37-38 (same); Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (same); Kizzire, 343 F. Supp.
2d at 1084-85 (same); Burton, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (same). At least one court
ruled that the EMTALA claim was defective in that the challenged conduct occurred after plaintiff had been admitted to the hospital as an inpatient, and that
EMTALA applies only to emergency room treatment, citing the proposition that
"[i]f the hospital admits the individual as an inpatient for further treatment, the

hospital's obligation [under EMTALA] ends." See Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1054
(citing 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(1)(ii)) (discharging hospital's obligation under EMTALA when it admits emergency patient as inpatient).
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The district courts' dismissals of the § 1983 claims were equally deci-

sive. 2 2 8 The courts ruled that a private hospital's receipt of federal and
state funding and tax exempt status does not transform it into a state actor,

229

and that none of the state action tests had been met.

2 30

Finally, nearly unanimously,2 3 1 the federal district courts declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims once all the
federal claims were dismissed. 232 These state law claims were dismissed
23 3
without prejudice to be asserted in a state court action.
Not only were the district courts' dismissals of the federal claims remarkable for their uniformity, but at least one federal district court judge
declared that based on all the prior dismissals, he would examine the
234
claims very carefully in light of Rule I I's prohibition of frivolous claims.

228. See, e.g., Sabeta, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6132, at *52-57 (holding that private hospital is not state actor for purposes of § 1983 claim); Hogland v. Athens
Reg'l Health Servs., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7763, at *28-31 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21,
2005) (same); Washington v. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-185 (CAR),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *26-28 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005) (same); Burton v.
William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 498-99 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (same).
229. See, e.g., Burton, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (defining state action).
230. See, e.g., Washington, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2614, at *26-29 (setting forth
state action test). The three tests to determine if action is taken under color of
state law are as follows:
A private party may be held liable as a state actor only if one of the following three conditions is met: (1) the State has coerced or at least significandy encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution ("State
compulsion test"); (2) the private parties performed a public function
that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State ("public function test"); or (3) the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint participant
in the enterprise ("nexus/joint action test").
Id. at *26.
231. But see Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 573
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing all federal and state law claims with prejudice); Bobo v.
Christus Health, No. 1:04-CV-626, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7249, at *11-13 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 26, 2005) (same).
232. See, e.g.,
Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C 04-02624 WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24592, at *16 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). The court cites the proposition that:
In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of the factors to be considered under the pendentjurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comitywill point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.
Id. (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1998)).
233. See, e.g., id. at *16.
234. See Charity Care Class Action Litigation Is Denied Federal Status, supra note
118, at 6 n.10 (quoting Collins v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., No. 3:04CV00276 (N.D. Fla.
Dec. 10, 2004)) (noting concerns whether plaintiffs' claims were frivolous).
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Perhaps the most telling dismissal of the federal claims was that of
Rivera v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.23 5 The allegations against Yale New

Haven Hospital were among the nation's most egregious, so that dismissal
of these federal claims signaled most clearly that the hospitals' billing and
collections practices were simply not actionable under the federal tax laws,
236
EMTALA or FDCPA.
These dismissals led to a rash of voluntary withdrawals by plaintiffs in
the federal district courts, presumably to re-file in state forums. 2 37 In one
such case, the court held the plaintiffs and their counsel jointly liable for
an attorney's fee award to the hospital of $40,000.238 The court noted the

extraordinary nature of such an award, 23 9 but justified it because "the
plaintiffs' claims likely amounted to millions of dollars and would have, at
a minimum, forced major changes in the financial operations and structure of [the hospital]." 240 Further, the court noted that plaintiffs had
made "lengthy, pointed and serious accusations of misconduct ... [that

would] tend to discredit the defendant in ways that would reasonably be
expected to garner substantial public attention." 24 1 While the court recognized that the indigent plaintiffs would have little or no ability to re235. No. 3:04-CV-1515 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2005); see also Claims Against Yale-New
Haven HospitalDismissed in Oral Ruling by Federal Court, supra note 119, at 241 (discussing dismissal of federal claims).
236. For a discussion of the aggressive hospital billing and collections practices used by Yale-New Haven Hospital, see supra notes 23-32.
237. See In re Not-For-Profit Hospitals/Uninsured Patients Litig., 341 F. Supp.
2d 1354, 1356 n.1 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (citing to voluntary dismissals of several actions
brought in federal court); see also Hagedorn v. St. Thomas Hosp., Inc., No. 3:040526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7259, at *7 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2005) (citing
voluntary dismissals granted by federal courts in other charity care class actions).
Reportedly, in some cases the Scruggs team moved to voluntarily dismiss their
federal cases when confronted with a demand from the court to produce evidence
in response to dismissal motions from the hospitals. See Dodging a Bullet; Scruggs
Has Four Hospital Class-Action Suits Dismissed, 34 MODERN HEALTHCARE 14 (2004)
(reporting dismissals initiated by Scruggs team when required to produce
evidence).
One published report declared that as of February 17, 2005, approximately
seventeen cases filed in federal courts had been voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs. See Claims Against Yale-New Haven Hospital Dismissed in Oral Ruling by Federal
Court, supra note 119, at 241 (reporting that federal hostility to plaintiff claims
against hospitals has led to widespread voluntary dismissals).
238. See Woodrum v. Integris Health, Inc., No. 5:04-CV-835, 2004 WL
3397808, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2004) (concluding $40,000 is reasonable
amount to award defendant).
239. See id. at *2 (stating that "[t] he court is mindful of the risk that an award
of attorneys' fees in this context might unreasonably chill the prospect of these or

other potential plaintiffs bringing an otherwise reasonable class action").
240. See id. (explaining that it would be unfair to put defendant's very existence at issue, force it to expend substantial defense costs and then merely dismiss

case).
241. See id. (noting that plaintiffs complaint attacked reputation of defendant, would garner unfavorable publicity, and that dismissing case would unfairly
deprive defendant of opportunity to put forth truth about its operations).
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spond to the fee award, the court stated that its concern was ameliorated
by the fact that the lawsuit appeared to be part of a "coordinated, nationwide effort" to attack non-profit hospitals, and was "more attorney driven
242
than client driven."
The wholesale federal dismissals have likely discouraged some defendant hospitals from prematurely settling these cases in an effort to avoid
243
the enormous time commitments and expenses that they entail.

IX.

EARLY CHARrTY CARE CLAss ACTiON RULINGS ON THE
STATE LAW CLAIMS

As a result of the numerous class action dismissals in the federal forums, the focus of the class actions has been shifting to state courts. 244 In
contrast to the ruling on the federal claims, some early results on the state
claims have been favorable for the plaintiffs. The Connecticut Superior
Court in Ahmad v. Yale-New Haven Hospital,Inc. 24 5 sustained plaintiffs' state
law claims against Yale-New Haven Hospital based upon Connecticut's bed

242. See id.
243. In April 2005, North Mississippi Health Services announced that it would
not finalize a settlement that it had tentatively agreed to in August 2004. See Mississippi Nonprofit Hospital System Shuns Proposed Charity Care Settlement, 14 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) 513, 513 (2005) (reporting on lawsuit against North Mississippi
Health Services). The hospital reportedly stated that the increased number of
claims for charity care that had arisen since it had signed the memorandum of
understanding had forced it to rethink its decision to settle. See id. (quoting hospital official as saying it had "reached an impasse in its attempt to reach a final agreement with respect to charity discounted care to the uninsured" largely because
claims are rising too high and too many patients are bypassing other local hospitals
in order to receive charity care). For a discussion of class action settlements that
have occurred, see infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text.
244. See As Federal Trial Court Setbacks Continue, Uninsured Plaintiffs Head for
State Courts, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 208, 208 (2005) (stating that Scruggs, coordinating litigator, announced that lawsuits will be shifting from federal to state
forums).
245. No. (X02)CV040183725S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2765 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 29, 2004).
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An Illinois state court

246. See id. at *23 ("[Pjlaintiffs have pleaded that the defendants failed to
provide them adequate notice of the availability of free bed funds and failed to
process properly any bed funds applications. . . .These specifications would, if
proven, constitute violations of the statute.").
Connecticut's bed fund law provides:
(b) (1) Each hospital which holds or administers one or more hospital
bed funds shall post or cause to be posted in a conspicuous public place
in each patient admitting location, including but not limited to, the admissions office, emergency room, social services department and patient
accounts or billing office, information regarding the availability of its hospital bed funds ....Such information shall include: (A) Notification of
the existence of hospital bed funds and the hospital's program to administer them and (B) the person to contact for application information.
(2) Each hospital which has a hospital bed fund shall train staff, including but not limited to, hospital social workers, discharge planners and billing personnel concerning the existence of such fund,
the eligibility requirements and the procedures for application.
(c) Each hospital which holds or administers one or more hospital bed
funds shall make available to individual members of the public, a onepage summary describing hospital bed funds and how to apply for them.
This summary shall clearly distinguish hospital bed funds from other
sources of financial assistance. The summary shall be available in the patient admissions office, emergency room, social services department and
patient accounts or billing office. If during the admissions process or
during its review of the financial resources of the patient, the hospital
reasonably believes the patient will have limited funds to pay for any portion of the patient's hospitalization not covered by insurance, the hospital
shall provide the summary to each such patient.
CONN. GEN.. STAT. § 19a-509b (2003).
247. See Ahmad, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2765, at *27-28 (ruling that defendants' practices violated public policy). The court opined:
[T]he defendants engaged in aggressive debt collection practices-such
as wage garnishments, collection calls, capias arrests, placement and foreclosure of liens, and seizure of assets-despite their actual or constructive
knowledge that the plaintiffs were eligible for free beds under the bed
funds statute or discounted care under the collecting at cost statute...
sufficiently state a case that the defendants' practices offended public policy established by statutes or were 'immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous' so as to satisfy the 'cigarette rule' test of unfair trade practice.
Id. Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) provides as follows: "No
person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42l0b (a) (2004).
The Ahmad court, however, dismissed a claim under the "collecting at cost
statute." See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-673(b) (2003) (providing that "no hospital
that has provided health care services to an uninsured patient may collect from the
uninsured patient more than the cost of providing services"). That court held that
the express language of the statute foreclosed the claim where plaintiffs were unable to show that the hospital had collected more than its cost. See Ahmad, 2004
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2765, at *26-27 (ruling that plaintiffs cannot redress
overcharging under statute unless hospital collects more than its cost). Ironically,
this statute, promulgated to prevent excessive hospital charges to the uninsured,
was of no assistance to the plaintiffs because they were too indigent to pay the bills.
In addition, the Ahmad court dismissed state law claims for breach of contract (no
allegations that hospital agreed to charge the plaintiffs third-party rates), recission
(refund of medical services was impossible) and tortious interference with plain-
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48
ruled in Servedio v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical CenteY2 that state

law claims alleging consumer fraud, 249 unfair practices 250 and breach of
contract were adequately pleaded.

25 1

In contrast to these favorable state rulings, several federal courts
opted to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims with prejudice, thereby precluding any re-filing in a state forum. The court in Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hospitat2 5 2 ruled that the hospital was not required to provide
discounted care as a condition of its state tax exemption. 2 53 Further, the
court rejected plaintiffs' state law breach of contract claim on the basis
that the hospital's charges were not unreasonable simply because the hospital had negotiated lower rates with governmental programs and private
payors. 254 The court rejected plaintiffs' state unfair trade 25 5 claim on the
ground that the hospital had not made deceptive statements. 25 6 Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim also failed because plaintiffs had not paid their
tiffs' relationships with financial institutions (no allegations that hospital even
knew about these relationships). See id. at *29-30 (explaining dismissal of claims).
248. No. 04 L 3381, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Ill. Jan. 6, 2005) (granting defendants'
motion to dismiss on April 19, 2005).
249. See id. at 3-6 (rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' consumer fraud claim). The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA) prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." See 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/2 (1999).
250. See Servedio, No. 04 L 3381, at 7-8 (ruling that plaintiffs adequately stated
claim for unfair practices under ICFA where they alleged that hospital charged
uninsured patients higher rates than most other patients and did not screen patients to identify those who qualified for charity care).
251. See id. at 9-10 (ruling that plaintiffs adequately stated claim for breach of
implied duty to charge reasonable price where hospital gave discount to all insured patients, potentially rendering its so called "usual and customary charges"
billed to uninsured patients unreasonable); see also Cristiani v. Advocate Health
Sys. Care Network, Inc., No. 03 L 14635, slip op. at 3-9 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill.
Nov. 15, 2004) (declaring viability of plaintiffs' state law breach of contract or alternative unjust enrichment claim pending amended pleadings, but dismissing plaintiffs' tortious interference claim); Hudson v. Cent. Ga. Health Servs., No.
5:04CV301 (DF), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2613, at *18-19 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2005)
(declaring, in dicta, that where hospital has two sets of "regular" prices, one for
insurers and governmental programs and another for uninsured patients, its contractual promise to uninsured to charge "regular" prices may be ambiguous). But
see Pitts v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., No. 04CV1991-3, slip op. at 3-11 (Super.
Ct. Dougherty County, Ga. June 27, 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs' complaint upon
finding no merit to plaintiffs' state law claims for breach of contract, breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, constructive trust, deceptive trade practices,
fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty
and negligence).
252. 382 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
253. See id. at 575 (characterizing claim as "baseless").
254. See id. at 576 (rejecting plaintiffs' breach of contract claim).
255. New York General Business Law Section 349(a) prohibits "[d]eceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce." See N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAw § 349(a) (McKinney 2004).
256. See Kolari, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (ruling that hospital's charging plaintiffs higher rates does not make its statements deceptive).
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bills and thus had not enriched the hospital. 257 The district court dismissed plaintiffs' state law fraud claim due to failure to plead fraud with
particularity and failure to plead the elements of fraudulent intent and
detrimental reliance. 258 The court dismissed the constructive fraud claim,
ruling that plaintiffs had not established that the hospital had a duty to
speak or that it had fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs. 259 Another district
court, following Kolari, also dismissed plaintiffs' state law claims with
prejudice, ruling that they were "indispensably premised" on the meritless
2 60
federal claims.
It is possible that the inconsistent results in the state and federal forums on the state law claims signal merely that the state forums will be
more receptive to plaintiffs' state causes of action. It is equally likely, however, that the state actions will yield mixed results. 2 61 These state claims
necessarily depend upon unique state interpretations of common law or
upon particular language of state statutes, so that one state's outcome
does not necessarily predict what will happen in others.
There have also been some interesting developments in at least one
state's tax agency. In April 2005, Illinois tax officials recommended denying property tax exemptions for parcels owned by the Carle Foundation. 26 2 The officials found that Carle does not meet the state's criteria
for a charitable tax exemption because, among other reasons, it
overcharged the uninsured and spent only one-half of one percent of its
revenue on charity care. 263 A similar tax ruling was rendered earlier in
264
the same forum against Provena Covenant Hospital.
257. See id. at 577-78 (rejecting unjust enrichment claim).
258. See id. at 578 (dismissing fraud claim).
259. See id. at 578-79 (dismissing constructive fraud claim).
260. See Bobo v. Christus Health, No. 1:04-CV-626, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7249, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2005) (declaring that "these meritless claims
against not-for-profit hospitals has the hospitals bleeding green"); see also Burton v.
William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 724 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2005)
(granting summaryjudgment to hospital on state law claims for breach of contract,
violation of Michigan Consumer Protection Act, unjust enrichment and constructive trust).
261. See, e.g., Pitts v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., No. 04CV1991-3, slip op.
(Super. Ct. Dougherty County, Ga. June 27, 2005) (illustrating dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims in state forum).
262. See Another Illinois Nonprofit Hospital Caught in Move to Revoke Property Tax
Exemption, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 583, 583 (2005) (discussing county board's
recommendation to state's Department of Revenue to deny Carle Foundation Hos-

pital charitable tax exemptions).
263. See id. at 583 (reporting that Carle Foundation provided "relatively small
amount of true charity care").
264. See id. (reporting similar ruling against Provena Covenant Hospital). In

February 2004, the State of Illinois upheld Champaign County's decision to revoke
Provena Covenant Medical Center's local property tax exemption. See CAROL
PRYOR

&

ROBERT SEIFERT, THE ACCESS PROJECT, THE HELLER SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, AN
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UPDATE ON CONSUMER MEDICAL DEBT,

http://www.cmwf.org/usrAdoc/pryor_medi-
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CHANGES OCCURRING IN

HOSPITALS' UNINSURED

BILLING AND

COLLECTIONS PRACTICES

At this relatively early stage in the state forum-based charity care class
actions, it is difficult to predict what the outcomes will be. After examining the voluntary changes that hospitals have made to their billing and
collections policies and the terms of the few settlements that have occurred, however, we can begin to see the changes that are likely to result
regarding hospitals' billing and collections practices.
Once the House Committee on Energy and Commerce commenced
its investigation into hospitals' billing practices, hospital associations
moved swiftly in an attempt to contain the problem. 2 65 The AHA issued
an "Alert" on June 10, 2003 to its 4,800 member hospitals across the country, urging them to stop harsh collections tactics for patients who did not
have the ability to pay and reminding hospitals that "compassion has to go
from the bedside to the billing office." 266 The AHA Alert suggested that
hospitals should be able to state their charges to patients before treatment, should identify low-income patients who might qualify for free or
26 7
discounted care and should avoid harsh collections practices.
In December 2003, the AHA followed up by issuing guidelines for
billing and collections. 2 68 The guidelines suggest that hospitals should
communicate clearly with patients about charges, help patients apply for
free or discounted care, review charge levels to make sure they are reasonable and pursue patient accounts in a fair manner. 269 The guidelines
2 70
have reportedly been adopted by 3000 of the AHA's member hospitals.
State hospital associations followed suit. The Healthcare Association
of New York State (HANYS) was one of the earliest to publish its own bill(stating that revocation was due to "past aggressive debt collection
practices (including lawsuits) toward needy patients"). The case is presently on
appeal before an administrative law judge. See Another Illinois Nonprofit Hospital
Caught in Move to Revoke Property Tax Exemption, supra note 262, at 583 (noting
pending appeal).
265. See Lucette Lagnado, Hospitals Urged to End Harsh Tacticsfor Billing Uninsured, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2003, at A9 (reporting changes to billing and collections
suggested by AHA).
266. See id. (emphasizing hospitals' "relationship with their communities that
is built on trust and compassion").
267. See id. (detailing elements of plan to ameliorate harsh billing and collections practices and provide more upfront discussion of payment expectations with
indigent patients).
268. See AHA, Hospital Billing and Collection Practices: Statement of Principles and Guidelines by the Board of Trustees of the American Hospital Association, http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/keyissues/bcp/content/guidelines
finalweb.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (discussing guidelines).
269. See id. (explaining guidelines).
270. See Leonard Post, Hospitals Hit with Plague of Lawsuits; UnfairBilling Practices Alleged Against Nonprofits, 26 NAT'L L.J. 1, 1 (July 19, 2004) (reporting adoption
of AHA guidelines).
MEDICAL DEBT]
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ing and collections guidelines. 2 7 1 HANYS recommended that hospitals
should promulgate financial aid policies to provide financial assistance to
all patients below 200% of the federal poverty level and sliding scale discounts to indigent patients with incomes at higher levels. 272 Significantly,
HANYS suggested that hospitals could apply Medicaid or private insurer
rates to the low-income uninsured, rather than full charges. 273 HANYS
also asked hospitals to communicate their financial aid policies to patients
and train their staffs to administer the policies. 2 74 Finally, HANYS urged
against foreclosures on patients' primary residences and body attachments, as well as asking hospitals to forego garnishments of wages unless
27 5
there was evidence that the patients had resources to pay their bills.
The primary author of the HANYS guidelines, Ray Sweeney, described the
27 6
message of the guidelines as "[d]on't try to get blood from a stone."
Other state hospital associations approved similar billing and collections
27 7
guidelines for their member hospitals, including those in California,
0
28
279
and Tennessee.
Oregon, 278 Illinois
Individual hospitals also announced changes that they were voluntarily implementing. A major not-for-profit hospital chain, HCA Inc., based
in Nashville, Tennessee, announced in fall 2003 that it would provide free
care to uninsured patients earning up to twice the federal poverty level
271. See HEALTHCARE ASS'N OF N.Y. STATE, FINANCIAL AID/CHARITY CARE POLYORK's NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS: GUIDELINES FROM THE HEALTHCARE
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YoRK STATE 1, 1-7 (2004), available at http://www.hanys.org/
digital-library/hanys/upload/Financial-Aid-Charity-Care-Policy-at-New-York-s-Notfor-Profit-Hospitals-Guideines-from-the-Healthcare-Association-of-New-York-State.
pdf (setting forth guidelines).
272. See id. at 2-3 (recommending financial aid policies).
273. See id. at 3 (discussing application of Medicaid or private insured rates
ICY AT NEW

for low-income patients).

274. See id. at 4 (reminding hospitals to communicate availability of financial
aid to patients).
275. See id. at 5 (reminding hospitals to "have collections policies that reflect
the mission and values of the hospital").
276. Lagnado, Cold-Case Files: Dunned for Old Bills, Poor Find Some Hospitals
Never Forget, supra note 98.
277. See CAL. Hosp. ASS'N, CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL BILLING AND COLLECTION
PRACTICES: VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR ASSISTING LOW-INCOME UN-

5 (2004), available at http://www.calhealth.org/Download/VolPrinciplesGuidlines204.pdf (adopting voluntary principles and guidelines for
assisting low-income uninsured patients).
278. See Gwen Dayton, Oregon Ass'n of Hosps. and Health Systs., Hospital
Discounting and Collection Practices, http://www.oahhs.org/publications/legalservicesbulletindiscounting.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (recommending discounted rates and fee waivers for indigent patients).
279. See ILL. Hosp. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CHARITY CARE AND
COLLECTION PRACTICES FOR THE UNINSURED 5-6 (2003), available at http://www.
ihatoday.org/issues/payment/uninsured/charitycare.pdf (stating billing and collections guidelines for indigent patients).
280. See Guidelinesfor Uninsured, Indigent Adopted by State HospitalAssociation, 13
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1459, 1459 (2004) (reporting Tennessee Hospital Association House of Delegates' approval of voluntary charity care guidelines).
INSURED PATIENTS
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and sliding scale discounts for patients with earnings up to four times the
poverty level. 28 1 HCA's new policy went into effect on January 1, 2005.282
Tenet Healthcare Corp., a large for-profit chain, announced that it was
ready to implement a compact with uninsured patients, pledging to bill
low-income uninsured patients at the same rates the chain received from
HMOs, subject to approval of the policy from the OIG. 28 3 North ShoreLong IslandJewish Health System unveiled plans to provide financial assis284
tance to patients earning up to 300% of the federal poverty level.
285
Other hospital systems have made similar announcements.
On the regulatory front, HHS moved quickly to issue guidance confirming that "hospitals can provide discounts to uninsured and underinsured patients who cannot afford their hospital bills and to Medicare
beneficiaries who cannot afford their Medicare cost-sharing obligations." 286 HHS declared that "The Federal anti-kickback statute does not pro287
hibit discounts to uninsuredpatients who are unable to pay their hospital bills."
With regard to Medicare beneficiaries, however, HHS continued to warn
that to avoid anti-kickback risk, the hospitals should not routinely waive
cost sharing amounts without first verifying financial need or before reasonable collection efforts have failed. 288 In December 2004, HHS further
281. See Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99 (describing Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) policy to discount rates to indigent patients).
282. See HCA Says It Will ProvideDiscounts to Uninsured, Cites New CMS Guidance,
14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 68, 68 (2005) (discussing implementation of newly
adopted charity care policy).
283. See Lucette Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing-Lawmakers Push Legislation
to Curb Aggressive Collection Against UninsuredPatients,WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at
BI [hereinafter Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing] (detailing Tenet Healthcare
Corporation's pledge to offer discounts to uninsured patients).
284. See Cinda Becker, Bill Collection, Self-Reflection, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb.
9, 2004, at 8 (noting that such assistance would exceed recommendations for charity care from Healthcare Association of New York State).
285. For example, at the end of 2003, the nation's largest Catholic hospital
chain, Ascension Health, stated that it would offer free care to every uninsured
patient whose income falls below the federal poverty level. See Lagnado, Medical
Shift, supra note 99 (outlining new charity care policy for indigent patients who do
not qualify for Medicaid). Yale-New Haven Hospital reportedly closed accounts
where the debts were more than five years old, removed property liens against
patients and created a sliding scale to provide discounted and free care to indigent
patients. See Ellen Moskowitz, Recent Developments in Health Law: Class Action Suits
Allege Improper Charitable Care Practices, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 168, 169 (2005)
(describing steps Yale-New Haven Hospital has taken to implement charity care).
The University of California-Davis reportedly has a policy of not suing uninsured
patients to collect debts. See Lagnado, Medical Markup, supra note 100 (stating
policy).

286. See Letter from Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, to Richard J. Davidson, President of the American Hospital Ass'n (Feb.
19, 2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040219.html.
287. See OFPERED DiscouNrs, supra note 179, at 1.
288. See id. at 1-4; see also Questions on Charges for the Uninsured, supra note
203 (providing guidance on application of Medicare payment rules to hospital discounting practices).
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clarified that hospitals could offer across-the-board discounts to uninsured
patients without first making individualized determinations of need and
that such discounting policies would not affect the hospitals' Medicare
289
reimbursements.
Several state and local governments also acted, promulgating statutes
requiring hospitals to make their charges public, 290 to disclose their charity care policies 291 and to restrict their collections procedures. 2 92 Several

289. See Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, FAQ http://www.cms.gov/providers/FAQUninsuredAdditional.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (stating that, contrary to earlier statement
made by OIG, "when a hospital discounts charges to non-Medicare patients, such
as uninsured patients, there is no effect on outlier payments under either Medicare's Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System or Medicare's Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System"). OIG,at a previous congressional hearing,
had declared that an across-the-board waiver of cost sharing obligations for uninsured patients would be "problematic," insisting that "[t]here would need to be an
individualized determination" of indigency. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 147 (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (stating that individualized determinations
would be necessary).
Here, however, the OIG may have confused uninsured patients with Medicare
patients. Copayments are payable only when there is another primary payor, i.e.,
an insurance plan, so that uninsured patients are never in a position of paying
copayments. In fact, the OIG later stated:
[W]hen we talk about Medicare co-pays and deductibles, we are therefore
talking about people who have insurance, they are covered by a program,
as distinct from those who are uninsured, for which, from a fraud and
abuse standpoint, we have no jurisdiction directly. So, if we are talking
about waivers of co-pays and deductibles for those who have Medicare
coverage, what we expect is some reasonable assessment of financial need
with a great deal of flexibility.
Id.
290. See Assem. B. 1627, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (enacted)
(requiring California hospitals to make their charge levels public); see also
Lagnado, Medical Markup, supra note 100 (reporting that California law requires
hospitals to disclose charges on all their items and services). Wisconsin requires
hospitals to report certain price increases. See WHA Information Center, http://
www.whainfocenter.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (accepting data submissions
for hospital price increases). Arizona hospitals are required to report patient
charges, which are compiled and published semiannually. See ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-125.06 (2004).
291. New York's Nassau and Suffolk counties passed local laws requiring hospitals to notify patients of charity care policies. See NAssAu COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN.

§ 9-23 (2003) (adopting resolution requiring notification to patients); SuFFOLK CouN-TY, N.Y., LocAL LAw No. 25-2003 (2003) (same).
292. A Connecticut law went into effect in October 2003 placing restrictions
on collections procedures for hospital patients and limiting interest on bills to five
percent. See 2003 CONN. Acrs 266 (Reg. Sess.) (enacted) (establishing collections
restrictions and interest limits); see also Lagnado, Medical Shift, supra note 99 (reporting that statute makes it more difficult for hospitals to sue patients, seize their
bank accounts and place liens on their homes).
CODE
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state legislatures considered statutes to limit charges to the uninsured. 293
294
Congress is considering a bill to require hospitals to post their charges.
In recognition of these changes, the authors of The Commonwealth
Fund report issued an updated report. 295 They pointed out hospitals'
abandonment of harsh collections practices, the passage of state laws to
ameliorate harsh treatment of the uninsured, several states' consideration
of bills to limit uninsured charges, the adoption of billing and collections
guidelines by state hospital associations and regulatory clarifications from
HHS. 296 The report declared that "[t]hese developments have significantly altered the environment related to hospital billing and collection
practices" and "represent a major shift in the environment surrounding
the development and implementation of hospital financial assistance policies." 29 7 The authors questioned, however, whether hospitals' voluntary
efforts would be sufficient to curb the abuses, or whether legislation was
298
necessary.
On March 10, 2005, Tenet Healthcare Corporation announced a proposed agreement to settle thirteen charity care cases against it.2 9 9 This
293. See, e.g., Assem. B. 2521, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (announcing bill to limit hospital charges to patients with household income at or
below 400% of federal poverty level to amount hospital would have accepted from
Medicare or its highest volume payor); H.B. 805, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2004)
(presenting bill to prohibit hospitals and other healthcare providers from charging uninsured patients more than Medicare rate); H.R. 1533, 1573, 147th Gen.
Assem, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2004) (considering two bills to prohibit hospitals from
charging uninsured patient greater rate than average managed care rate); S.B.
379, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (presenting bill to cap hospital charges to
low income patients at Medicare or workers' compensation amounts); S.B. 2579,
93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003) (considering bill to prohibit hospitals from
charging patients with incomes equal to or less than federal poverty level and to
limit charges to cost for patients with incomes up to 400% of federal poverty level).
But see CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-13-119 (2004) (prohibiting providers from waiving
deductibles and copayments as "regular business practice," but allowing such waivers for charity care where providers determine indigency on case-by-case basis and
where such waivers are not applied to more than one-quarter of providers'
patients).
294. See Hospital Price Disclosure Act of 2005, H.R. Res. 1362, 109th Cong.
(2005) (requiring hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers to disclose charges for
their twenty-five most frequently performed inpatient and outpatient procedures,
and their fifty most frequently administered drugs dispensed to inpatients).
295. See generally UPDATE ON CONSUMER MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 264
(describing changes in hospital billing and collections).
296. See id. (summarizing changes to alleviate consumer medical debt).
297. See id.
298. See id. (considering voluntary versus regulatory approaches). Another
study announced in October 2005 made similar findings, observing that many nonprofit hospitals across the nation have expanded their charity care to include sliding scale discounted rates depending on the patients' income levels. See CTR. FOR
SYS. CHANGE, BALANCING MARGIN AND MISSION: HOSPITALS ALTER
3-4 (2005), availableat
http://hschange.org/CONTENT/788/788.pdf.
299. See Tenet Announces ProposedSettlement of Suits Alleging Overchargingof Uninsured, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 353, 353 (2005) (describing proposed settlement).
STUDYING HEALTH
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settlement requires the hospital to give estimates of charges and financial
counseling to uninsured patients, to provide discounted pricing at managed care rates, to offer reasonable installment payment schedules, to refrain from suing uninsured patients and to refrain from placing liens on
homes of uninsured patients. 30 0 In addition, Tenet agreed to make refunds to uninsured patients who had received treatments between June
15, 1999 and December 31, 2004 and who had paid more than a given
percentage of gross charges, with the percentages varying by year of treatment.3 0 1 Tenet stated that the terms of the proposed settlement are con-

sistent with its compact with uninsured patients announced in 2003.302
The California Superior Court approved the settlement on August 5,
2005.303
Other settlements have been reached as a result of the Minnesota Attorney General's investigation of hospitals' charity care practices. 30 4 A settlement with Fairview Health Services allows uninsured patients and
families earning up to 450% of the federal poverty level to receive discounted pricing.3 0 5 Fairview is also required to reform its debt collection
methods, which had included suing indigent patients, garnishing their
wages and sending debt collectors after them. 30 6 Settlements announced
on May 5, 2005, with four other Minnesota hospitals require the hospitals
to charge the uninsured and patients with annual incomes less than
$125,000 no more than the hospitals charge their private payor providing
A copy of the proposed Tenet Settlement Agreement is available online. See Proposed Tenet Settlement, http://op.bna.com/hI.nsf/id/psts-6agrfn/ (follow "Proposed Tenet Settlement.pdf" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
300. See Tenet Announces Proposed Settlement of Suits Alleging Overchargingof Uninsured, supra note 299, at 354.
301. See id. at 353 (noting that Tenet estimates it billed $400 million in
charges between June 15, 1999 and December 31, 2004).
302. See id. at 354 (describing stratified Tenet refund policy for uninsured
patients). For a further description of individual hospitals' voluntary election to
modify uninsured billing practices, see supra notes 299-301 and infra notes 303-12
and accompanying text.
303. See Judge Approves Nationwide Settlement of Allegations Tenet Overcharged Uninsured, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1088, 1088 (2005).
304. See Fairview Health Services, Minnesota AG Reach Deal on Charity Care, Debt
Collection, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 514, 514 (2005); Press Release, State of Minn.,
Office of the Attorney Gen., Agreement Between Attorney General and Minnesota
Hospitals Will Provide Fair Pricing to Uninsured Patients, Establish Code of Conduct for Debt Collection Practices (May 5, 2005) [hereinafter Press Release, Agreement Between Attorney General and Minnesota Hospitals], available at http://
www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PR/PR_050505HospitalFairPricing.htm (announcing reduced rates for uninsured patients participating in Allina Health System,
North Memorial Health Care, Park Nicollet Health Services and HealthEast Care
System).
305. See Fairview Health Services, Minnesota AG Reach Deal on Charity Care, Debt
Collection, supra note 304, at 514.
306. See id.
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the most revenue to the hospital.30 7 The settlements also require the hospitals to offer free or discounted care to eligible patients, to offer payment
plans to patients who cannot pay the entire bill at once and to soften col308
lections practices.
Most recently, uninsured patients and the Providence Health System
reportedly reached a settlement in a charity class action, announced on
November 1, 2005.309 Providence has reportedly agreed to discount its
3 10
billings to all uninsured patients to equal its average insured rates.
Providence also will give additional discounts ranging from 100% (to uninsured patients who earn 200% or less of the federal poverty level) to
10% (to uninsured patients who earn up to 400% of the federal poverty
level). 3 1' Providence has agreed to apply the discounts to patients who
received services at Providence for the past four years, and to patients who
3 12
receive services for the next two years.
XI.

CONCLUSIONS

The changes that have recently taken place regarding hospitals' indigent billing and collections practices are so obviously rooted in common
sense, it is a wonder they have not occurred before this time. Obviously,
hospital rates for the uninsured should not be the highest rates the hospitals bill to all payors.3 1 3 Once indigency is determined, either on a case by
case basis or more globally using the federal poverty level as a benchmark,
the uninsured should be billed at rates that are at least on par with those
paid by governmental programs and private insurers.3 14 It is likely that
307. See, e.g., Agreement, In re Allina Health Systems, No. CI-05-4576, slip op.
at 13-14 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 5, 2005), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/PR/HspAgrAllina.pdf (stating settlement provisions).
308. See Press Release, Agreement Between Attorney General and Minnesota
Hospitals, supra note 304 (delineating specifics of agreement that State Senator
Ann Rest describes as "overall system of fairness"). A settlement has also been
reached in Servedio v. OurLady of the ResurrectionMedical Center,but the terms of the
settlement are confidential. See Settlement of Uninsured Lawsuit in Illinois Against Resurrection Health Care Confirmed, 14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 760, 760 (2005).
309. See Settlement Reached Between Oregon Nonprofit Hospital, Uninsured Patients,

14 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1433, 1433-34 (2005).
310.
thirty-one
311.
312.

See id. at 1433 (reporting average discount for preferred provider rate as
percent).
See id. (reporting sliding scale discounts).
See id. at 1433-34 (announcing application of agreement both retroac-

tively and prospectively).
313. Health policy expert Uwe Reinhardt has termed this type of pricing "brutal and inhumane." See WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 7. New York Legal Aid
Society attorney Elisabeth Benjamin called it "the secret shame of the U.S. healthcare system." See Lagnado, House Panel Begins Inquiry into Hospital Billing Practices,
supra note 138 (quoting Elisabeth Benjamin).
314. Some suggestions are that the uninsured should be billed at a rate that is
higher than the rates paid by insurers and managed care plans, so that the marketplace will not be disrupted, such as the Medicare DRG rate plus twenty-five percent, or the highest rate the hospital charges to any insurer or managed care plan.
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reducing rates (and interest rates on unpaid bills) for the uninsured will
not even have a substantial fiscal impact on hospitals, because as the hospitals themselves insist, they were rarely able to collect full charges from the
315
uninsured anyway.
For hospitals that utilized aggressive collections tactics for this population, it is obvious that the collections should be conducted in a more humane manner. As many commentators have observed, medical debt is not
like other debt, as it is not voluntarily assumed, and as the Journalarticles
pointed out, tens of thousands of dollars in hospital bills may be incurred
3 16
suddenly, without warning and after only a few days of inpatient care.
Obviously, if a hospital has a charity care policy that offers free or discounted care to indigents, the hospital should tell qualified patients about
it and make that assistance available to them. Hospital staffers should be
schooled about their institution's charity care policy, and should be helpful and sympathetic in assisting patients with their applications. Once indigency is determined, collections should not be effected by means of
residential foreclosures, wage garnishments that leave the working poor
unable to meet their basic needs or body attachments. To quote Ray
Sweeney of HANYS, the only sensible rule is: "Don't try to get blood from
317
a stone.'
See Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Gerard F. Anderson, Director, Johns
Hopkins Center for Hospital, Finance and Management) (suggesting rate methodologies for indigent patients).
315. See id. at 4 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood, Member, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations)
(referring to December 2002 remarks by Trevor Fetter, CEO of Tenet Healthcare,
noting that seventy percent of uninsured patients do not pay their bills); id. at 98
(statement of Herbert Pardes, President and CEO of New York Presbyterian Hospital) (remarking that New York Presbyterian Hospital collects only twelve to thirteen percent of charges for services furnished to uninsured patients); Tenet
Announces Proposed Settlement of Suits Alleging Overchargingof Uninsured, supra note
299, at 354 ("If the uninsured as a class were not paying the managed care prices in
the aggregate, then a reduction in rates would probably have little impact on the
bottom line." (quotingJ. Mark Waxman, General Counsel of Caregroup, Boston));
see also CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, BALANCING MARGIN AND MISSION:
HOsPITALS ALTER BILLING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES FOR UNINSURED PATIENTS 5

(2005), available at http://hschange.org/CONTENT/788/788.pdf (confirming
that "changes in billing and collection policies have had negligible impact on hospital finances to date").
316. See, e.g., Lagnado, Taming Hospital Billing, supra note 283 (stating that
"hospital bills are by nature different from other consumer debt-such as bills for
washing machines-because most patients didn't choose to incur them"). Other
sources support this proposition by stating:
Health care is a business unlike most others .... [T]heir product is essential and often life saving .... Purchases are often sudden and unplanned

and, particularly for people without health insurance, may bring large
financial burdens that are involuntary in the sense that they are not the
result of a traditional consumer choice.
CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL DEBT, supra note 76, at 2.
317. See Lagnado, Cold-Case Files: Dunned for Old Bills, Poor Find Some Hospitals
Never Forget, supra note 98.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss1/11

52

Cohen: The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured - No Villa
20061

CONTROVERSY OVER HosPITAL CHARGES

While the focus of uninsured charges has been almost exclusively on
hospitals, we should also bear in mind that the same system of charges for
the uninsured can occur with regard to other types of healthcare providers
as well, including physicians, dentists, medical device suppliers, pharmacies, etc. 3 18 Relief from charges should be broadened to include the full
range of providers who charge the uninsured at the uppermost limit of the
3 19
providers' rates.
The expos6 on hospital billing and collections practices for the uninsured has not been a proud chapter in healthcare history. Had it not been
for a single reporter at the Journal,it is possible that the issue of hospital
charges for the uninsured might still remain largely hidden from public
view. 320 While it is understandable that hospitals legitimately may have
believed that tampering with their charge schedules to give rate relief to
the uninsured would have exposed them to anti-kickback risk and
threatened them with lower Medicare reimbursements, this does not excuse hospitals for their silence. 3 2 1 Nor could regulatory concerns ever justify practices like those by the Carle Foundation, which first treated an
uninsured patient for attempted suicide and then later had him arrested
322
for not paying his bill.
The government and the private insurance industry also are not free
from blame. They too were certainly aware that a substantial segment of
middle America was being victimized by exorbitant hospital charges, but
failed to take action to publicize the issue or lobby for change. While the
class action lawyers may assert that they acted swiftly to attempt to right
this wrong, in fact they flooded into the federal courts with legal theories

318. See, e.g., Lagnado, Full Price, supra note 33 (reporting case of Rebekah
Nix, who was billed at full charges by her anesthesiologist and other doctors who
treated her at hospital because she did not have health insurance).
319. See UPDATE ON CONSUMER MEDicAL DEBT, supra note 264 (stating that
efforts to alleviate medical debt should include all types of healthcare providers);
see also H.B. 805, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Al. 2004) (proposing limits on charges to
uninsured by full range of healthcare providers, including physicians, dentists, hospitals and other healthcare professionals).
320. For a further discussion of Lucette Lagnado's articles on hospital
charges to uninsured patients, see supra notes 23-66 and accompanying text.
321. See Hearing,supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood,
Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations) (stating that "[i]f hospitals believed that Medicare rules
created roadblocks to doing the right thing for the uninsured, why did they not
raise it with HHS earlier").
322. See Lagnado, Medical Seizures, supra note 59 (reporting Carle Foundation's execution of body attachment on uninsured part-time musician whose original treatment at Carle was for self-inflicted gunshot wound in botched suicide
attempt); see also WORKING POOR, supra note 73, at 7 (describing case of Rose Shaffer, billed $18,000 for three days of inpatient care for heart attack, reported to be
suffering from the stress of being sued by hospital over bill and quoted as saying,
"[t]he hospital saved my life and now they're trying to take it").
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that were plainly unsupportable under current law. 32 3 The Kolari court
aptly described the federal claims as "bootless" and "without basis in law,"
and referred to the plaintiffs as "hav[ing] lost their way." 324 So far, all that
the class actions have accomplished is to drain thousands of dollars out of
hospitals for defense costs that could have been allocated to charity
care.

32 5

Finally, even with the changes that are now occurring to make hospitals a kinder and gentler place for the uninsured, the basic problems that
the uninsured face in obtaining necessary medical care have not changed
much. Hospital bills, even at prevailing managed care rates, will probably
continue to be beyond the means of the working poor or the unemployed
to pay. This population will continue to be subject to collections, albeit of
discounted amounts, with only the most aggressive collections tactics being abandoned. 326 As some healthcare experts have observed, the only
real answer is to make basic coverage health insurance available for
327
everyone.
323. For a further analysis of legal arguments asserted by class action attorneys against hospitals that were rejected by federal courts, see supra notes 205-43
and accompanying text.
324. See Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 566 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
325. For example, Tenet has agreed to pay $11 million for plaintiffs' attorneys
fees to settle the charity care class actions against it. See Proposed Tenet Settlement, supra note 299 (presenting terms of agreement). Further, the administrative burden of the class actions is evident, as Tenet produced 1.2 million pages of
documents during negotiations over the settlement. See id. (commenting on voluminous documents produced during negotiations).
326. See, e.g.,
Lucette Lagnado, New York State Hospitals Agree to Cut Prices for
Uninsured, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2004, at BI (criticizing Healthcare Association of
New York State's charity care guidelines because hospitals "can still charge 9%
interest, they can still grab your paycheck, they can still sue you, [and] they can put
liens on your house" (quoting Elisabeth Benjamin, healthcare attorney with New
York Legal Aid Society)).
327. See, e.g.,
Hearing, supra note 1, at 92 (remarking that "[t]he problem is
how are we as a society going to guarantee that every American has some form of
health insurance" (quoting Jack 0. Bovender, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Hospital
Corporation of America)).
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